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Of the vast mosaic of alliaaces. seoret 
treaties and eoonomio rivalry that preoeded the World 
War. historioal reaearch has widely negleoted that 
section involving the negotiations of Germa.ny and 
England on t~e possibility of the ultimate partition 
of the Portuguese colonie8 between themselves. Thes. 
negotiatlons cover much of that period before the 
flrst World War durlng whioh the ulianoe systems were 
con8ummated. Examination of these negotiations gives 
some imsight into the labyrinthine tunnels of seoret 
treaties. alliances. and oounter-uliances. SUch an 
examina tion not only shows how such stupld diplomaoy 
works but also serves as an exoellent reflector bJ 
whioh one oan see how imperialism and balanoe of power 
beoame motivations for the various alignments that did 
so muoh to make modern hiStory what it is. Hence tit 
oan be said that the Portuguese negotiations offer an 
interesting study not only for their inherent histori-
cal value but also for the illumination they obliquely 
cast on the genesis of the disastrous allianoe system 
and its natural result--the World War. 
The negotiations themselves that occurred 
i~ _______________________________________ ~ 
vi 
between Germ&n7 end England beoause of the colonies 
of England's age-old ally, Portugal, fall into two 
main divisions. The first division embrace. an in-
trioate series of diplomatic maneuvers just prior to 
the Boer War. a series of maneuvers that had COD-
siderable importance in determining the complexion of 
that war. The second series involving the Portuguese 
colonies occurred approximately two years prior to 
the World War. The seoond development was in reality 
an outgrowth of the fir st, which had become dormant 
after Eng1s.nd refused to make an iDl1DBdiate division 
of Portuguese oolonies possible. The seoond period 
of negotiation was begun more as a means of finding 
some grounds on which to establish the beginning of a 
better understanding between mntually hostile Germany 
and England than simply as a means of increasing the 
oolonial domains af the respective negotiators. 
The episode has a rather sordid oharacter 
beoause Portugal, a sovereign state, was not offi-
oially consulted during the negotiations. nor waa 
Portugal informed of the oomplete oontents of the 
treaties that resulted from these negotiations. 
Although more or less forced by the pressure of 





this ante-mortem dissection of the Portuguese Empire, 
England's participation was particularly embarrassing 
to her. It was embarrassing beoause England and 
Portugal had been oonstant allies for over half a 
millemum. The manner in whioh England resolved the 
dilemma of keeping an old friend (Portugal) at the 
S8me time she was supposedly paying tribute with her 
friend's possessions to a possible enemy (GermaD7) 
fully cognizant of hi. potentiality provides an 
interesting problem of research. 
In order to show the salient features of the 
problem, this paper will endeavor to aooomplish the 
following: (1) give a oomprehensive background of 
Anglo-portuguese relations from the inoeption of the 
old friendship between those two oountries to the end 
of the Nineteenth Century, (2) give a background of 
the international situation that diotated England'. 
diplomatio negotiating with Germany for the possible 
disposal of Portuguese possessioDS, (3) give an 
account of the negotiat1ons, (4) analJze the motiva-
tions, (5) analyze the outcome, and (6) attempt to 
show the i.mpossib11ity of secret alliances based on 
selfish fears. 
Al though a oonscientious effort was made for 




acouracy and objeotivity in this research, some 
hypothecation was neoessary to explain why England 
agreed to discuss the possib1lity of dividing her 
friend's empire and to explain why the agreement. 
relative to the division ot the empire never 
materialized. If the writer appears to tend some-
what toward partiaJ.ity and conjecture. he begs that 
the color ot events in the international soene at 
the time of this writing be accepted a8 So partial 
exou.e. 
After the first reference to the British 
Doo'WDenta !! .!!! Origin .!1 the War and,Di. Grosse 
Politik !!! Europaisohen Kabinette ta this thesis 
they w111 be respectively referred to as B. D. and 
G. P. 
No specific maps illustrating the territorial 
distribution .et forth by the treaties were avail-
able for the writing of this thesis. The data on 
the maps appearing in this thesis were assimilated 
from the text of the treaties themselves. The infor-
mat10n was verif1ed as well as possible by comparison 
with general maps of Afrioa. Good cop1es of suoh 
map. appear in the following atlases: 
Hammgnd's New World Atly!' Doubleday Doran, 
!nc., Garden Clt7, New ork, 1939 
The Matthews-Northr;; New International 
Itta., Blue RIbbon oii7 Inc., !ew York 
Any gene;al atlas could be used, however, for verifi-
cation. 
CHAPTER I 
THE "ANCIENT" PORTUGUESE-ENGLISH ALLIANCE 
OIUPfEB I 
THE "ANCIENT" PORTUGUESE-ENGLISH ALLIANCEl 
"England does not make alliances--
she grants them." 
--Lord Cranborne. eon of Lord Salisbury 
Near the close of the Middle .&g.s--IS'l1 to 
be preci •• --a treaty was concluded between England'. 
House of Lancaster and Portugal's House of Avis. 2 
This treaty was to be the predeoessor of a vast and 
uninterrupted series of treaties binding these two 
-
kingdoms into an alliance that became by far the 
3 oldest existing alliance of the world. In faot. if 
one were to be exact. the seeds of this understanding 
that is eo deeply rooted .in modern history were alreadl 
sown during the Crusades, when the English and Portu-
guese established the friendship that was to grow into 
this most permanent of all allianoes. 4 With but few 
1. The word "Anoient" Is used here despite the 
fact that the treaties were conoluded in medieval 
rather than ancient times beoause the diplomatio docu-
ments refer to them as the anoient treaties. c.f. 
British Doouments on the Origins of the World War. 
Vol. I, los. i!, 91:" - - - -
2. British Parliamentary Acoounts and Papers 
1899, OII t090S!}. pp. 6Sff. ----
3.,. Jones, Guernsey. "Beginnings of the Oldest 
European Allianoe: England and Portugal," A.meric8.D 
H1s1orical Assooiation Report !2.!: llil~ It 407. 
4. Ibid., p. 407. 
2 
alterations the relations between England and 
Portugal have been essentially the same for almost 
three oenturies, unshaken by wars and revolutions 
involVing either or both states. Truly this is a 
phenomenon of extraordinary rarity in international 
relations. A~ first oonsideration it might even 
seem queer, beoause of the laok of oommon interests 
and similarity of raoe, but allianoes are not built 
upon oommunity or raoe, religion, or ideals, to say 
nothing of sentiment or affeotion, but upon oommnnitl 
of fears. 1 England and Portugal have never lacked _ ................... 
oODlJlon enemies. 
An examination of the content of this ancient 
treaty and its successors provides ample proof of 
commi tments tbs t England made to Portugal and vice 
, -
versa. These created a unique and rather embarrassing 
diplomatic situation for England when Germany under-
took to negotiate with her for Portugal's oolonie. 
during the years 1898-191'. 
Tne Treaty of 1373, conoluded just four years 
before the death of Edward II, oame as a result of the 
Hundred Years War, whioh involved by this time, not 
only Franoe and England, but also Castile. Henoe. it 
1. Jones, loo. oit., p. 40V. --
was deoidedly benefioia1 for England to enlist th. 
ald of the Portuguese. The treaty gave immediate 
ald to England, but put restraints on her in sub-
sequent dealings relative to Portugal. The follow-
ing articles from the treat,v themselves explain 
these restraints: 
TREATY SIGNED AT LONDON. JUNE 16, 1373 
Article I 
In the first place, we settle and covenant 
3 
that there shall be from thle day forward between 
our above said Lord Edward, King of 'England and 
:l'rance, and Lord :l'erdlnand, King of Portugal and 
Algarve, and the Lady Eleanor, Queen and his 
consort, the ir suooessors in the aforesaid King-
doms ••• and their realms, landa, dominions. 
proVinces ••• true. faithful, oonetant. mutual 
and perpetual [friendehip) they shall henceforth 
reCiprocally be friends to friends and enemie. to 
enemies and shall aSSist, maintain, and uphold 
each other mutually by sea and by land against 
all men that may live or die, of whatever dignity. 
station, rank or oondition that may be and against 
the ir re alms and do mini ons.1 
They shall strive for peaoe, as much as in 
them lies, and personal safety, seourity, int!rest 
and honor, and the harmlessness, conserTation and 
restitution of their rights, propertj, ettec~s ant 
friends, wheresoever they be. 
They shall everywhere faithfully prevent the 
hurts and injuries, disgrace, or baseness whioh 
they mow or whi ch one party knows to be at any 
future time intended or contemplated against the 
other party, and shall provide remedies for them; 
••• without reserve, and fully inform, forewarn 
and successfully counsel the other party against 
whom such things are meditating •••• 
x. Undersooririg mine. 
Article II 
Also, neither party shall form friendships 
with the enemies, rivals or persecutors of the 
other party or knowingly himself or through 
others advise, aid or favour the enemies, rivsls, 
or persecutors of the other party, to his detri-
ment, hurt, or prejudice; or gratify them in any 
way, receive them into his kingdom or lands, 
or knowingly suffer them to be gratified, 
reoeived, oounterbalanoed, or harboured, either 
publicly or privately under any specious exouses, 
oontrivances or pretexts • • • 
Also, if the kingdoms, lands, dominions, or 
places of the other party should happen to be 
infested, oppressed or invaded by sea or by land, 
by enemies, (etc.:j, or if any of these ••• 
prepare in any manner or appear • • _ anxious to 
infest or oppress • • _'iaid shall be given] .1 
Over five oenturies before 1898 England had 
already bound herself to preserve Portugal's dominions, 
strive for the conservation of Portuguese rights and 
property, prevent everywhere injuries and disgraoe 
which she knew were even oontemplated against her ally, 
maintain straightforth oommunioation to Portugal of 
any information that involved the safety of Portugal 
and refuse to give comfort to the rivals of Portugal. 
Of course, at the time of the signing of the treaty 
England received much in return for suoh self-denying 
limitations. Portugal acted as a bulwark against her 
continental rivals. 
Thirteen years later in 1386 the clauses of the 
1. BritiSh Parliamentary Accounts ~ Papers, 
!!!. !!i., pp. 67-69. 
1373 Treaty were re-emphasized in a new treaty 
executed at Windsor. Evidence of this can be 
espeoially noted in Clause VII. 
TREATY SIGNED AT WINDSOR, MAY 9. 1386 
Article VII 
Further it is agreed that if either of the 
aforesaid parties oan learn, discover, or anti-
oipate any injury, oontumely or disadvantage 
to have been planned or meditated against the 
other party, on sea or land, manifestly or 
privately, he shall prevent it aa muoh as in 
him lies, as though he were desirous of prevent-
ing the ~jury and contumely intended to his own 
interest and Shall endea.vor by all means 1n his 
power, that such deSign, With all the particu-
lars oonnected with it may be brought to the 
notioe of the other party against which it 1. 
so intended... and e",err artifioe, d,oeit, and 
tnvention anall be abstained from.l 
Between 1386 and 1642 there was an intermilsion 
of treaty making; nevertheless good relations were 
maintained beoause the two powers never seemed to be 
Without oommon enemies. Then, too, the growing in-
fluence of the commercial classes in an inorea.singly 
powerful English government made inevitable the con-
tinuanoe of the advantages that oould be had from 
judioiously manipulating this Willing pswn. 2 
In 1642 a treaty was concluded between the 
English House of Stuart and Portuguese House of 
1. BrItISh Parliamentary ACcounts and Papers, 
l!!.2.. .2.U.., pp. 69-'10. . -
2. Jones, loc. cit., pp. 407-8. --
.... _-- - .. _--------
6 
Braganza which gave to the English merchants in 
portugal a reasonable amount of religious toleration, 
protection from financial losses resultant from the 
Inquisition plul extra-territorialitl and immunit7 
from Portuguese lawl. l In addition to these valuable 
oonoessione the oontracting powers reiterated their 
previous deolaration of mutual trust and assistanoe 
when they guaranteed to each other in Article I of 
the Treaty Signed at London, Januar7 29, 1642 that, 
••• Neither of the said most renowned KiAgB, 
their heir. and euooessor by himself or aD7 
other, ehall do or attempt against each other 
or their Kingdoms by land or by Bea nor shall 
they oonsent or adhere unto any war counsel, or 
Treaty in prejudioe of the other. 2 
For a time it seemed that the Puritan Revolu-
tion would destroy the understanding between Catholic 
and Pro-Stuart Portugal end the now more or le88 
Protestant England. In faot Portugal was the only 
power to espouse overtly the Stuart oause.S Portugal 
had always been friendly to the Stuarts. She afforded 
Charles I access to the rest of Europe by allowing her 
ambassadors and diplomatic offices to be used for 
1. liii¥ls; lr.ttamentari A§coua\s and Paper@, 
loc. oit., pp. & - • --
2. Ibid., p. 71. . 
z. Jones, loc. cit., p. 411. --
'1 
oommunioation and even for the transportation of 
money and smmunition. l Suoh aotion naturally 
brought dawn on Portugal's head the wrath of the 
avenging Republio and postponed oonsiderably (26 
years) the inevitable final form of the Anglo-
Portuguese Allianoe. In fact, for 3ust a ahort 
time there was a state of war between Portugal and 
the Proteotorate when the Royal "Pirates" Maurioe 
and Rupert took refuge in the fagus RiTer. Crom-
well blookade' Portugal. King John IV retaliate' 
bJ 'eolaring war. However, he was powerless to do 
more than imprison English merchants and sequestrate 
propertf. So when the Republioan Victory of Dunbar 
indicated the real strength of England, John Bued 
for peaoe. which Oromwell agreed to by exeouting an-
other treaty in l6~4. This treaty granted England 
a oonsiderable indemaity and added to the meroantil-
istio concessions she had alrea~ seoured.! After 
this treaty was signed Englishmen shared equal privi-
legea with the Portuguese in the Portuguese colonies. 
It also reemphasized and repeated what had been 
guaranteed before: 
1. Jones, 100. oit., pp. 409-416. --
2. Ibid., p. 411. -
8 
It is also agreed and oonoluded that no 
other league or confederaoy whatsoever made or 
to be made by the most Serene Lords, the Pro-
tector of England and the King of Portugal, 
with &n1 other prince. or republios whatsoever 
shall derogate from the present treaty of peace 
and alliance, but that the peace and confederai'l' 
shall be kept entire and alw~8 in full foro •• ~ 
E'ven more than the Treaty of 1642 the agreement 
of 1654 was regarded as a charter of liberties for 
Engli8h in Portugal.! It is interesting to observe 
that although Portugal was the only nation to oppose 
the Republio openly it was also the first to Bend a 
credited ambassador to the "Parliament and Commonwealth 
of England. e3 So, despite sentiment, Portugal W88 
more interested in England and not English governments. 
Although the relations between the two countries 
during the Pnritan interlude were fraught with tenSion, 
the relations again beoame reciprooally helpful and 
friendly. As early as 1660, Portugal was obliged to 
call upon the despised republio for aid against her 
enemias. A treaty with the usual Anglo-Portuguese 
assurances was oonoluded. It was about to go into 
effect when the Restoration dissolved the Commonwealth. 
1. BrItiSh J.Sarliamentm looounts and gaper!. 
loc. oit., p. 1: ' -- , 
2. Jones, ~. ~., p. 413. 
3. Ibi4., p. 412. 
I 
I' 
When Charles II returned to England he hal 
intended to reverse the entire foreign polioy of 
Cromwell. However, his oonneotions with France and 
negotiations for the marriage with Catherine of 
Braganza by his ohief minister, Clarendon. soon 
postulated a reversal of his original intentione.l 
9 
!be marriage of the two dynasties gave the 
penultimate touch to the allianoe, It was not a 
sudden deoision, for a proposal for marriage was made 
in 1",.2 It had long been a oheriShed wish of Por-
tugal's John IV.S The matter was again disousee' 
just atter the execution of Charles I. Charles II 
was found to be sympathetic. Throughout the Puritan 
orisis the Royal House of Braganza had extended aid 
and sy.mpath7 to the dispo8sessed oooupants of the 
House of Stuart. When Charles returned to England 
wifele.s, he provided in himself the keystone of 
English foreign policy which was in truth merely a 
oorol1ary of that of Louis XIV." During hie exile 
1. Jones, 100. cit., p. 413. --
2. Ibid., pp. 409-410. 
3. Ward, A. W. and Goooh, G. P., ~ Cambridge 
History ~ British Foreign PoliOI, I, 16. 
,. Green, John Richard, History ~ the English 
Peopl., III, 236ff. 
10 
Charles was obliged to depend upon the Tarying 
hespi tality of Lo111s' K1ngdom. So to him a certain 
amount of gratitude was due. However, Charles did 
not fall in line with Louis so much out of gratitude 
as he did beoauae he knew that only by the aid of 
Louie would he be able to realize his aims. He knew 
that Louis was deSigning to reduoe Spain to a8 near 
a state of Tassalage as pOSSible and that Loui. 
ne ede d English support to make his hegemony complete. 
By marrying himself to Portugal t an ally of France 
and foe of Spain, as he had his sister, Henrietta, 
to the Dnke of Orleans, Charles aligned himself. 
though not formally but nevertheless, definitely, 
with France. Of course, Charles reoeiTed something 
in return for the marriage conveniently arranged b7 
hiB loyal Clarendon. He reoeived the subsidies of 
Louis whioh made possible his independenoe from 
Parliament and luxurious and profligate life. How~ 
eTer, England as a nation, too, reoeived oonsiderable 
material returns, not from LOUis, but from Portugal, 
which helped more than a little in laying the founda-
tiona for the domination of the Mediterranean and 
India. l The English received a dowry of half a 
1. Jones, loc. oit., p. i19. --
11 
Ddllion pounds--fabulous in those daY8--the fortress 
of Tangier in the Mediterranean. the trading center 
of Bombay, India, and political pledges of religious 
toleration for all Englishmen throughout the Portu-
guese Empire. l At first this arrangement was 
distasteful to the English people as a whole, for it 
oame at the same time that Charles arranged for the 
disposal of Dunkirk to Louis XIV.! The people did not 
relish trading hard-won Dlmkirk for diatan t Tangier, 
nor did they like the growing power 0 f the SUn Kine 
whose Bourbon Dyna8ty was beginning to be as muoh o'f 
a specter to them as the now waning House of Hapsburg 
had onoe been. 3 
Nevertheless, by sealing this bargain, sinoe 
aid to Portugal was a steady Frenoh policy, England 
ranged herself on the side of France as a foe of 
Spain and a8 suoh contributed muoh to the downfall of 
her former rival and perseoutor.' With English and 
French support Portugal was able to insure for all 
time her independenoe from Spain for whioh she had 
1. Green, ~. oii., p. 237. 
2. Macaulay, Thomas Ba b1ngton, The History of 
England !!:2!! !!l!. Aocession .21 James II71, 1'19. -
3. Ibid., p. 179. -
4. Green, ~. !!i., p. 237. 
12 
been struggling for sixty years. l So just aa 
Spain reached her pinnacle of greatness in Portugal, 
she started there, too, her downfall.! As event. 
subsequently proved, this downfall was continuall7 
aided and abetted thenceforth by the maintenance of 
the Anglo-Portuguese Alliances. 
There was still another factor in the conolu-
sian of this alliance. That 11, the mercantilistic 
Clarendon was extremely eager and energetio in 
inserting commeroial clauses in the wedding treaty, 
in an attempt to make the marriage to the Cathol10 
Infanta more palatable for meroantil1stio and 
Protestant England.3 
This union then, of Charles and the Infanta 
of Portugal not only aligned Charles with Louis 
but was open admission that Cromwell's suocess-
ful fpreign policy was to be resumed. 80 
de.pite the Puritan restoration interlude and 
oomio opera Anglo-Portuguese war of 1642, there 
waa no real alteration in the relations of 
Portugal and England •• 
The marriage was formally sealed by treaty on 
June 23, 1661 at Whitehall. The first article and 
secret article of this treaty are interesting because 
1. Jones, log. Cit., pp. iOB-9. 
2. Green, ,2R.. cit. t p. 23'1. 
3. Jones, loc. oit. , p. 415. - -
4. Ward and Gooch, £R.. ill,., p. 29. 
they specifioally bind the signers to abide by all 
previous treaties and to protect all conquests of 
both from all enemies, both present and future. 
Article I 
11 
That all Treaties made between Great Britain 
and Portugal since 1641 until this very time 
shall be ratified and·confirmed in all pOints 
and to all intents, and shall recei VEt as full 
force and ratification by this treaty as if the7 
were herein particularly mentioned and inserted 
word by word. 
Secret Articles 
His Majesty of Great Britain in regard of 
the great advantages and increase of dominion he 
hath purchased by the abOTe mentioned treaty of 
marriage shall promise and oblige himself as by 
this present article he doth to defend and 
protect ell oonquests or colonies belonging to 
the Crown of Portugal against all his enemi •• 
as well future as present. l 
From this time on the arrangements between 
Portugal and England remained extraordinarily constant 
and were neTer subject to ohange--merely re-emphaaie 
of the original theme--that is, with the exception in 
the years 1898-191' which is the raison d'.tre of this 
discussion. 
If some authorities neglect or refuse to oon-
sider the earlier foundation of the "Oldest Alliance,· 
none deny that 1661 marks the beginning of thi8 
relationship. Even this date gives it ample claim 
1. BritiSh Parliamentary Iocounts and Papers, 
loc • cit., p. '12. ---
for the moat durable of all understandings--over 
two hundred and fifty years. 
The remaining treaties that were concluded 
in subsequent years comprise a mere oatalogue of 
reaesurances~-England's rise to world leadership 
bears witness of this point throughout. 
14 
During the War of Spanish Secession, Portugal, 
true to her obligations, adhered to England and be-
oame a member 0 f the Grand A11iance.1 To bolster 
and olarify their relations the allies reaffirme' 
their intentions toward eaoh other by another treaty. 
which reads in part as follows: 
TREATY SIGNED AT LISBON, MAY 16, 1'03 
Article I 
All former treaties between the above said 
powers (England and Portugal) are hereby approve4 
and confirmed and ratified and ordered to be 
exaotly and faithfully observed exoept ineofar 
a8 by the present treaty is otherwise provided 
and estab1iehe4. 2 
At the Peace of Utreoht after this war England 
was instrumental in seouring concessions for Lisbon. 3 
• Barnes, 
2. British Parliamentary Accounts and Papers, 
!2.2.. ,gji., p. R! -
3. Ward and Gooch, ~. oit •• p. 54. 
11 
During the Seven Years War Portugal was invaded by 
Spain beoause she refused to end all correspondence 
and commerce with England. l However. by supplement-
ing the national resources of Portugal. England aoon 
offset the effects of the invasion. 2 During our 
American Revolution, Portugal was briefly at war 
with Spain, America's ally.1 
The Portuguese seT.rumen. remained steadfast 
to England during the Napoleonic struggles even when 
the homeland was taken over by the Empire of France. 
In 1807 Portugal was the only country whose ports 
were excluded from the restriotions of the Orders in 
Council. Later in the same year when Franoe move' in 
on Portugal, the British persuaded the Portuguese 
government to fle. from the homeland to Brazil rather 
than capitulate to Napoleon's demands by even so muoh 
a8 a token war on England.' The British reoeived 
permission to use the Ports of Madeira and the 
Portuguese Fleet.1 
1. Ward and Gooch, .Qlt. cit., p • 121. -
2. Ibid. , p. 123. 
3. !l!!i. •• p. 166. 
4. Ibid •• p. 365. 
5. Ibid. , p. 365. 
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There was a treaty of Rio de Janeiro, ' 
signed between England and the Portuguese government 
in exile, February 19, 1810 to fit the peculiarities 
of the Napoleonic situat1on. l This treaty was abro-
gated in 1810 when a new one was instituted, Which 
again put the Anglo·Portuguese relations in their 
customary place. Article III explains this entire 
situation: 
The Treaty of Alliance concluded at Rio d. 
Janeiro on the 19th of February, 1810, being 
founded on circumstances of a temporary nature, 
which have happily ceased to exist, the said 
treaty i8 said to be v01d in all parts and of 
no effeot, without prejudice to the Ancient 
Treaties of Allianoe, Friendsh1p and Guarantee 
which hereby renewed by the High Ccntractin, 
Powers and e.clmcwle dged to be in full force 
and effect.! 
After the Napoleonic furor, England sank into 
comfortable and "splendid isolation." In fact, for 
a period of more than fifty years she had no permanent 
al17. except little Portugal. 
In 1871 when there were republican agitations 
in Spain for an annexation of Portugal to Spain, 
England stood up for Portugal by informing the Spanish 
Minister that she would brook no external interference 
1. BritiSh Pgliamentary Aocounts and Papers, 
~. £i!., p. 1i. 
2. Ibid., p. 79. 
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in the affairs of her a1ly.l 
In 1875 Portugal's colonial possessions in 
the vicinity of De1agoa Bay in MOzambique, one of 
the colonies invo1Ted in the German negotiations, 
offered specific grounds for negotiation between 
England and her old ally.2 The Bay itself had been 
the object of nUDerous counter conquest claims by 
Holland, England, Portugal end eTen Austria; although 
Portugal claimed it first by right of discovery. AI 
late as 1861 the British ship Narcissus raised the 
British flag over the territory. Portugal protested 
but hostl1ities did net deTe10P between these two 
contenders and friends of convenience. Instead it 
was finally decided to allow Marshal MacMahon, 
President of France, to act as arbitrator. 3 Evidently, 
~gland was not too certain of her claims because the 
British minister to LisboA requested in a note to 
Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs that although 
a deCision had not yet been reached by Marshal 
1. !fltish Documents ~ th8 orii¥s of the War 
1898-191', !, 51-2, No. 69, encIi": JL)7 anr~3. 
2. Bixler, Raymond, Ang1~-German Imperialism 
!A South Afrioa 1880-1900, pp. 04-5. 
3 .. British and Forei~ State payers, 1872-'3, 
LXIII, l045H. (Clte'lby Bi er, gjl. o·t., pp. 104-5.) 
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MacMahon, Great Britain and Portugal should enter 
into mutual agreement to the effect that the power 
in whose favor the award was made not "entertain any 
proposal for the acquisition of this territory until 
the defeated claimant had an oppo.rtuni ty of making 
the successful claimant a reasonable offer for the 
acqui8ition of that territory either by purchase or 
some other oonsideration. nl The British minister 
implied that sooh an aoquiai tion by a third partr 
would damage the oOnfidence and seourity of relations.2 
In replr to thiS, Portugal gave her fUllest assurances. 
Marshal MaoMahoJl deoided in favor of Portugal, who 
still has sovereignty over the area. 
The episode has more than passing interest for 
this thesis, because of the relation of the Delogoa 
Bay area to the negotiations of 1898 with Germany and 
." 
Portugal. Closely related to this question was a 
treaty signed between the two allies, June 11, 1891. 
This treaty defined the spheres of influenoe of eaoh 
in Africa and safeguarded British interesta in Delagoa 
Bay- Artiole VII of the treaty points this out: 
1. BiXler, !.E.. cit., p. 105. 
E. British poreit? and State Papers, LXX, 
1878-9, NO. 70, pp. 318 (oited by Bixler, U. oi~., 
pp. 10",-101). 
, 
• • • The two powers agree that in the event 
of one of them proposing to pert with ally of 
the territories to the south of the Zambesl 
assigned by these articles to theirrespeotive 
spheres of influenoe the other shall be 
reoognize' as possessing a preferential right 
to the territories in question or &l17 portion.. 
of them upon terms similar to those propo8e4.~ 
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In 1894 Great Britain. fearing that GermanJ 
might aOQ,\1ire nelagoa Bay, informed the Portuguese 
gOT8rnment that she would not part with 8IlJ right. 
whioh would diminiSh the value of preferential claims 
granted to her in that area. 2 
Relatione between Portugal and her protector 
remained the same until 1898 when GerlIlS.l17 began to 
negotiate with England for possible acquisition of 
Portuguese colonies. These negotiations, of course, 
cast some doubt on the possible status of England 
and Portugal's alliance. However, Within a year 
after 1898. England had conoluded another treat7 
with Portugal which reaffirmed the old relation. 
This was the 80-oalle' "Treaty of Windsor" and waB 
signed on the 14th of October 1899 to give England 
reassurance of Portugal's attitude in the use of the 
Port of Lorenco Marques in Portuguese East Afrioa 
1. BritiSh FQrei~ and state Papers, 1890-91, 
LXXXII. 32 (cited by Bix:er, ~. ~., pp. 104·5). 
2. Bixler, ~.-2!i., pp. 107-8. 
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by England in the event of a war with Transvaal. l 
This treaty, of course, showed that England 
still had advantages to gain from her Portuguese 
friendship and intended to keep them--her negotia-
tions with Germany notwithstanding. The truth. of 
this intention is evinced yet again when England 
signed a treaty for arbitration of mutual disputes 
at Windsor, November 16, 1904. !he preamble to this 
is very similar to the numerous venerable treat18s 
of the past: 
WINDSOR TREATY 
Being moreover desirous of confirming, b7 
a further solemn Agreement, the friendship and 
alliance whiCh have happily subsisted for so 
long a period between them, and the two nation. 
which they represent, and of eliminating as far 
as possible, from their mntual relations. 
everything which might tend to impair or weaken 
that friendship and alliano, [a treaty of 
arbitration i8 conclude4J 2 
fhis treat,. was renewed in 1909 by Sir Edward 
Gre,. for a period of five years. 
The treaties of 1898, 1904, and 1909 have 
more than passing significance in that they were a 
series of treaties steadfast to the age-old friend8hip 
1. See Appendix D for the text of this 
declaration. 
2. Briti8h FOrei!! and State Papers, 97, pp. 68-9. 
This treaty is the real reaty of Windsor--rather than 
the Declaration of 18t9. 
" 
and yet renewed at a time that they were oounter 
to the more recent German treaty of 1898. The 
resolution of this enigmatio situation requires an 
investigation-of European conditiona between 1898-
1914. 
fhe diplomatic evidence of the treaties 
leaves no doubt that England oonsistently wante' 
the friendship of her small ally, Portugal. Both 
countries received much benefit from this mutual 
understanding. Portugal had constant proteotion 
from her two large neighbors, Yranoe and Spain, ani 
!l 
a collaborator in certain eolonial negotiation. in 
Afrioa. She also had a ready market for her princi-
pal produot, port wine, whose entire export trade 
centered in the English market, because of special 
privileges dating baok to Methuen's treaty of 1703.1 
England in return had a constant springboard for 
continental wars and a wedge between Spain and France, 
as well as valuable commeroial rights. The treat7 
series indeed had its advantages, but also ita liabili-
ties. England sometimes found that this friendship 
went oontrary to the opportunistio policy of "muddling 
through." It also obligated her sometimes When ahe 
i. War! and ~Oocht !L. ~., p. 166. 
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would not have been. Then too, the English national 
disease of gout might be attributed by some &8 a 
direct outgrowth of the treaty of Methuen, ainoe 
practically the entire output of port wine was sent 
to England as a result of this treaty. 
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With the approach of the Twentieth Century 
there was a tremendous ohange in the value s of inter-
national relations. The German and Italian wars of 
national unifioation ushered in a whole .eries of 
new problems and rivalries. The European oontinent 
was being divided into armed camps whose relative 
power was evenly enough balanoed to give eaoh one 
reason to pause before antagonising the other. l 
Although international relations were still 
being oarried out aooording to the archaio practices 
inherited from the old dynastic subject-state system,! 
the technological changes that the Twentieth Centur7 
had fostered and the expansion of rival imperialisms 
presagtd an imminent ohange. International problems 
no longer were of a striotly European oharaoter. 
Signs were rapidly appearing whioh indioated that 
the next oonflict of interests would be worldwide. 
The world was undergoing a "diplomatic revolution" 
1. Ward and Goooh, ~. oit., III, 266. 
2. Hale, Oron James, Publioity ~ Diplomaol, 
p. 3. 
2' 
which required international problems to be settled 
on inoreasingly broader general lines. l 
This revolution ha4 been given impetus by 
the resignation of Bismarck from the international 
scene. The absenoe of his diplomatic sagaoity wa. 
soon notioed in the Weltpolitik policy of Germany_ 
However, the revolution was in the making even before 
this. It started with the beginning of Germany's 
Pan-German and colonial aspirations, sweeping. in 
spite of his well-founded oonviotions to the contrary, 
even the solid Bismarck into the ourrent whioh was 
to lead his GerIDall7 into the maelstrom of .elboli tik. 
When Germany became a colonial power she did 
much to upset the balanoe of Europe. German oolonial 
dreams and sohemes very soon created rivalries and 
hostilities, prinoipally with England. 2 ~his rivalry, 
ooupled with Germany's new navy program, whos. pur-
po .. by lets left no illusion to the "two-power 
standard" theorists of England, eventually forced 
England into one of the hostile oamps. Therefore, 
Bismarck's earlier acquiescence to a colonial empire 
1. 
p. 596. 




Larson, L. M., ! Short History of England, 
later provided a logioal exouse for a large navy. 
Thus he unwittingly laid the groundwork for Eng-
land's final deoision to participate in the Triple 
Entente and the inability of Germany to arrive at 
an alliance agreement. ~riendship with England was 
a oardinal polioy with the Iron Chanoellor. l He 
was e"an opposed to a ~rma.n navy powerful enough to 
.gitate England.! What he did not sae was that hia 
supposedly innoouous oolonial polioy, when adminis-
tered by hands other than his own, was to beoome the 
stimulant that upset the equilibrium of hi. plan for 
Germany'. seourity and prasaged a fatal navy rivalry 
as well. 
But in the early 1890's no one could yet fore-
tell what the situation eventually would be and that 
Germany would be more hostile to England than ~ 
other power. .111 that was evident was a ohange in 
world politics whioh was definitely unfavorable to 
England's favored position. At the time German agita-
tion was only one of a large number of perplexing 
problems that could not be olearly understood because 
1. Count ti1hetm von Bismarck 'EO Ohanceiior 
Bismarck, August 19, 1885, Grosse Politik der 
Europai8ohen Kabtnette, IV, 1a,. ~ 
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diplomate and statesmen were still grasping at 
pt1nolple. whose usefulness had already slipped awa7 
with the approach of rapid oommunioation and the 
machine age. 
In fact. in 1887. England had made a friendl, 
en tent e wi th Italy. one 0 f Ge rmany' s partners in the 
Triple Allianoe. l FaBdly relatiOns between Windsor 
and Potsdam were very oordial. 2 These relations were 
oordial enough to give the final impetus to Russia to 
enter into an entente with Franoe. Thus England, 
for a time at least, was not in suoh an unfavorable 
position with referenoe to Germany. In faot, she waa 
in a position to cast a deoiding vote between the two 
sides that were now forBdng. 3 Germ8lt1' did not realise 
this. As yet, most of the British diplomats oould 
not grasp the situation beoause of their enoumbranoe 
by the policy of the past. Both powers were at an 
important historical crossroad and did not know that 
they were. 
m the 1890's in England foreign relations were 
still influenoed by the timeworn prinoiple of isolation, 
i. jiay, !hdiiey :B. t Origins 0 f the Worid War, 
p. 125. 
2. Ibid., p. 125. -
3. Seton-Watson • .2R, • .!!i., p. 5'10. 
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80 often oalled, "splendid," but at beat. preoarious. 
England, Binoe ~rafalgar, was the undisputed mistress 
of the seas. She, therefore, enjoyed an independenoe 
of aotion rarely obtained b7 other powers of that 
day. Her geographio insularity further amplified 
her aloofness from nearby European problema, whioh 
for her were never so muoh oauses of a Bet system of 
polioy 8S individual motivations for partioular oppor-
tnni ties. After Napoleon, England's oabinet trimmed 
her ssils more and more to a line of aotion epitomized 
by Canning's famous phrase "with every British 
Minister the interests of England ought to be the 
shibboleth of his policy."l The only set polioy was 
that of opportunism or what is more oommonly known as 
the polioy of "muddling through.- For over fifty 
years England steered away from permanent alliance. 
with any oontinental nation. The sole exoeption was 
Portugal. The "deviliah" Palmerston epitomlzed this 
polioy well by stating: 
I say it is a narrow polioy to suppose that 
this country or that is to be marked out as the 
eternal aUy or the perpetual enemy of England. 
We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual 
enemie.. Our interests are eternal and perpetual 
and those interests it is our duty to follow. 2 
1. Seton-latson, ~. ~.t p. 459. 
2. Ibid., p. 459. -
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Suoh a viewpoint was 1nherited by the oon-
servative ministry of Lord Salisbury. His work at 
the end of the century attempted to follow the old 
policy. In many respeots, however, he began to 
realize some need to cooperate in continental 
matters. But even though he frequently inolined to 
cooperation, he was partioularly adverse to pledging 
England in a4vanoe to act on oiroumstanoes which had 
not yet ariaen. l He was oonstantly adveree to for-
mal allianoes.2 
In fact, it was only when the danger of war 
with South Africa appeared that English diplomaoy 
began to understand clearly its position in relation 
to the other aspiring empires stimulated by the open-
ing of new areas of the world, scientific achievements, 
the development of large scale industry and oommerce 
and the inorease of population. These sought an out-
let for their energies whioh might preserve the pre-
cariOUS balanoe in ~rop •• 8 In going overseas, 
however, these powers actually caused the upset which 
x. Temperley, Harold and Penson, L!llian, 
Foundations ~ British Foreign Poliol. p. 621. 
8. Ward and Gooch, ~. ~., II, 261. 
3. Ibid., p. 267. 
they sought to avoid. l England. the earliest of 
the expansionists, had contiguous conflicting in-
terests in almost every seotion of the earth where 
the others tried to stake a claim. 
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England was faced with the perpetual Russian 
effort to expand her Empire in directions that were 
dangerous to her colonial possessions. The Russian 
danger was particularly perplexing because the large 
Russian land mass made it possible for that country 
to spread farther afield without enoountering the 
dangers of the British fleet on the high seas where 
alone she was supreme. 
BritiSh claims and interests encountered 
Russia's at pOints widely separated over the world. 
Russia's expansion into Manchuria was seriously 
menacing England's commercial and naval superioritr 
in the orient.2 The oolossal weight of the Tsarist 
Empire was being felt more and more on the borders 
of England's Indian Empire. 3 Russia was continnal17 
nipping a.t the heels of Tu.rkey t whose maintenance 
until late in Salisbury's ministry England regarded 
1. Ward and Gooch, !!. oit., II!. 26t. 
2. Fay, ££. cit., pp. 128-9. 
3. Ward and Gooch, ~. ~., III, 267. 
a8 an essential to her imperial safety.l Likewise 
England had incurred the hostility of France 1J1 
eeveral instances. Lord Edward Grey, Foreign 
Minister of England during the World War gave the 
folloWing picture of the si tu,ation: 
• • • There was constant friction, rising on 
the slightest provooation to quarrel ani hos-
tility, between Great ~ritain and France or 
Russia. The ground swell of ill~will never 
0888ed. British interests touched those o~ 
France and Russia in IDaIq parts c f the World 
and where interests touch, an atmosphere of 
111-w111 i8 always dangerous. The blackest 
suspicion thrives on it, like nonous growth 
under dark skies in ~rk¥ air.2 
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Even previous to 1898, England had had con-
siderable disagreement with France about the colleot-
ion of debts and the gradual establishment of 
suzerainty in Egypt. In this situation Germany gave 
some moral support to England. 3 Perhaps this was a 
carry-over from Bismarck's policy of keeping France 
and England disturbed so as to turn French eyes ~rom 
Germ&nf. However, ~ismarck also encouraged Franc-e's 
colonial policy at the same time so that there would 
1. Fay. 2R. ~., p. 12'. 
2. Grey, EdWard, Twentl Five Years, II, 11. 
3. Nicholson. Harold, Portrait of a Diploma-
tiat (Sir Arthur Nicholson), p. Oi. ----
31 
be bad blood between England and Frsnce. l England 
also had to be careful of French expansion in the 
Indo-Chinese area.! In l89S there was considerable 
hostility about the Nigerian boundary in Africa.3 
Ma30r Marchand of Franoe and General Kitohener of 
England met under warlike conditions in the disputed 
African area. This was but the final of a series of 
unfriendly event. between the two anoient enemiea. 
An early war appeared to be inevitable. 
While England was faced with all of this 
rivalry Germany was making her own late bid. MOat 
of the unolaimed territory of the world at that time 
was situated in one of the moat disputed areas, 
namely, Afrioa. Germany beoame a neighbor of Eng-
land on both the east and west ooast of Africa. 
She attained these separated areas just in time to 
oompete at oross purposes with the remainder of the 
• 
Afrioan oolonial powere in attempting to join their 
various scattered possessions. Cecil Rhodes wa. 
beginning to conjure up his visions of the Cape-to-
1. Sehm1tt t Bernadotte, England ~ Germani 
l'.O-19li, p. 15l. 
2. Ward and Goooh, ~. ~., VIII, 288. 
3. Fay, !£. ~.t p. 128. 
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Cairo empire. On top of all of this, Italy was 
making a bid for Abyssinia. Of all of England's 
danger spats, Afrioa provided the greatest number 
of possibilities of an open confliot. In spite of 
the Anglo-German treaty of la9€) by Whioh England was 
given all German olaims to Afrioan Zanzibar for 
European Helgoland, relations gradually, almost 
imperoeptibly, beoame strained by a oontinuous 
suooession of these events. 
Potentially the Krueger Telegram episode waa 
just suoh an oooasion. It further indicated that 
Ger~ already was not anxious to build up diploma-
tic oordieli ty between herself and England, the 
deolarations of the Kaiser end the lineup of Europe 
to the oontrary notwithstanding. This evidence 
becomes more pointed when one observes that the 
date of the raid was 1896, two years before 1898 
when Chamberlain's bid for a German alliance was 
refused by Germany. Yet the effeots of the event 
were distinctly felt years after its ocourrenoe. It 
was a orisis that oould have led to an eolipse of 
British supremaoy in South Afrioa. As it finall,. 
resolved itself, the resulting suspioions of German 
reaotions beoame a permanent feature in Anglo-German 
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relations. l Retrospective examination indicates 
that the gradual deterioration of English and German 
relations had definitely begun with the Jameson Raicl 
and its direot result, the Kaiser's telegram to 
President Krueger of Transvaal. 2 Germany's conduct 
in this situation was the initiating cause of the 
final breakdown of Bismarck's policy of friendship 
with England. 
For some years prior to 1896, because of her 
South African colonial interests, Germany had been 
extremely friendly with the Boer Republic, England's 
big problem in lower Afrioa for over a generation. 3 
In fact, this friendliness with the Boers grew in 
proportion to the animoSity that developed between 
the Germans and the English. Economio and political 
relationships became so intimate between the German 
and Boer by the middle of the "nineties" that Germany 
oontrolled over a fifth of the foreign investment. in 
the Boer Republios.' Big commercial houses froll 
1. darro!l, E. M., Germany ~ the Great 
Power" 1866-1914, p. Z62. . 
2. Lovell, R. I. t !h!. struggle !2!:. South 
Africa, p. 368. 
3. Brandenburg, Erioh, !t2!! Bismarck to !!1!. 
World !!I, , p. 80. 
4. Carroll, ~. ~., pp. 362-3. 
Germany maintained thriving branches ill Pretoria 
and Johannesburg. 
The Germans had a sentimental s37lIlpathy for 
the Boers as well as a materialistic one. They 
regarded these Dutch farmers sa a. "small people of 
Germanic blood struggling to maintain their inde-
pendence" despite the pressure of a. colossal Eng-
lsnd. l For these reasons the colon1al enthusiasts 
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of GermaIlY had long earmarked the srea as a desirable 
and likely possession--of, if not a position, at 
least s means of challenging and blocking British 
• 
superiority in South Africa. This viewpoint wsa 
exemplified when President Xrueger to s large group 
of Germans assembled st Pretoris on the Ksiser's 
birthday expressed his gratitude for past German aid 
and confidence for future help. England protested 
that aocording to the Treaty of Pretoria (1884) and 
the convention of London (approved by Bismarck, 1881). 
the Republic oould not independently make &n7 
arrangement with a foreign power. Germsny showed 
her stsnd by promptly informing England that her 
interests required an economically independent Trans-
vaal. with open c01DDlWliostioll from Pretoria to Delsgoa 
1. Carroll, ~. cit., pp. 362-3. 
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Bay in Portuguese Mozambique. l 
These oomments ooinoided with German aotions 
in the conatruction of the railroad from the Portu-
guese Mozambique port of LorenBo Marques to Pretoria. 
This was the Transvaal's only non-English outlet to 
the sea. The project received considerable financial 
support from Germany. Such action, threatening the 
English position not only in the Transvaal but in 
Portuguese East Afrioa was emphasized particularlr 
by the appearsnce of two warships at the port and 
the dispatch of a congratUlatory telegram to President 
Kraeger by the Kaiser. 2 England had attempted to 
forestall the damage this railroad would do to her 
African Empire by securing a lease to Delagoa Bay, 
the Mozambique terminus of the road. 3 This effort 
was thwarted tn 1893 by Germany and the united States, 
who interfered ostensibly because they feared that 
suoh a lease would damage their holdings in the portu-
guese railroad. 4 Brandenburg even states that the 
Anglo-German animsi ty had its inception at this 
1. Carroll, .2R.. cit., p. 363. 
2. Brandenburg. .2,2 • .ill., p. 80 • 
3. Lovell, ~. ~., p. 342. 
4. Brandenburg, ~. oit., p. 45. 
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The railroad episode of July, 1895, was 
still sore in the mincls of England and Germany When 
Sir Edward Malet, the British Ambassador, made his 
final leave of the German Emperor before replaoe-
mente In his oonversations he went beyond what a 
oircumspeot farewell would require by remindins 
William that Germany's attitude in reference to the 
African situation and Boer problem could cau •• 
trouble.! The Kaiser said that Malet even mentioned 
"war for the sake 0 f a few square mile. of nigger. 
and palB trees; war with Queen Viotoria's grandson 
and England r s only friend."3 Salisbury. the Prime 
Minister of England, expressed his surprise to the 
German Ambassador when he learned of this remark and 
stated that Malet had had no offioial instruotions to 
make suoh a statement.4 Lovall implies that Joseph 
Chamberlain, the Colonial Seoretary, might have 
inspired Malet to utter the remark. 5 However. 
1. Brandenburg • .2,;2 • .ill., p. 45. 
2. Carroll t .2,2. ill,., p. -364. 
3. Kaiser's Ootober 29, 1895 Report of a Con-
versation with Colonel SWaine, G.P., VI, No. 2529. - -
4. Lovell, !.E. • .2.ll., p. 35~. 
5. Ibid., p. 354. 
J. T. Garvin, Chamberlain'. apologist, supports 
blet's deniel. of the remark. 1 
Regardless of the emot wording of Malet' 8 
remarks, the Kaiser's subsequent oomment. to the 
British Military Attaohe, Colonel Swaine, show that 
he might have even welcomed the excuse they or 
similar remarks gave Germany to state her position. 
In hi. comment. to Swaine, William 
3' 
••• ended with a threat that if England con-
tinued to 'insult and fool' the Dreibund as she 
had for the past seven years, he woUld be 
'-.imply forced to make common cause with France 
and Russia.' Britain, he conoluded, oould only 
esoape from her isolation by 'coming out lUl-
re aervedly and openly on the side of the Triple 
Allianoe or against it.'! 
Here the Kaiser expose' himself and the ourrent 
German polioy--to browbeat England and at the same 
time "make great oapital out of this story, also for 
possible naval demands to proteot our growing trade.-3 
Brandenburg substantiates this viewpoint somewhat, 
eTen though he does place the Kaiser's remarks in a 
more excusable setting.' The Kaiser had made up his 
1. GarTin, J. L., Life of Joseph Chamberlain, 
III, 65. 
2. Seton-Watson, !£. £11., p. 576. 
S. William II to Marschall October 25, 1895 
(Note), G.P., XI, No. 2580. --
4. Brandenburg, ~. ~.t p. 81. 
mind that he was not gOing to treat England with 
"kid gloves" any longer; if friendly persuasion 
wouldn't do the triok, intimidation would. He wa. 
resolved to show definitely to England the dangers 
of isolation and how muoh she needed Germanyl_-at 
Germany's price, however. 
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At the time that Malet made this purported 
statement, Marschall, the German Foreign Seoretary, 
stated that the German government's interests in the 
Boer Republio had of necessity to oppose any possible 
inoorporation of those states into British Rhodeaia. 
Public opinion in Germany demanded that the govern-
ment make such a stand.! He oountered Malet'a 
remarks by saying England could not afford to anta-
gonise Germany beoause she had too many enemies. 3 
Germany's stand was based on insistent reports that 
Rhodes' South African Company was plotting a revolt 
of the· Ui tlander8 1n the Transvaal." 
Such was the situation when news flashed over 
the world that Dr. Jameson, Cecil Rhodes' administrator 
1. Lovell, ,2£. oi t. , p. 363. 
2. Marschall's Report October 15, 1895, G.P., - -XI, 5. 
3. Ibid. , pp .. 5-7. -
4. Carroll, .2l?- ~., p. 364. 
of the South Afrioan COmpaDT'8 territories and 
head of private oompany polioe, had crossed the 
border with six hundred men into the Transvaal. 
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The avowed purpose of this raid was to come to the 
aid of an uprising of persecuted English Uitlanders 
(aliens), supported by money and arms from RhOdes. l 
!he conspiracy was a complete fiasco. How-
eTer. it might have had some chanoe for success had 
it been confined to an internal reTolt of Uitlanders 
desiring a "new republio." But, when the Jameson 
party, coming from South African Company territor,r, 
was superimposed upon the "internal revolt," the 
plot failed. Jameson disregarded a postponement of 
the uprising and impatiently "jumped his gun" on 
December 29, 1895. As a result, the Uitlanders 
were forced hastily to summon their men together at 
an extreme disadvantage. They were easily overoome 
by President Krueger's troops at Krugersdorp. This 
"putsch" was definitely Rhodes' responsibility. The 
British Cabinet had no part in the raid although 
Chamberlain probably knew2 of it and consequently, 
was guilty of the sin of "omission if'not commission."3 
1. Bryoe, James, Briton and Boer t pp. 35 if. 
2. Garvin, !E.. ill,., III, '14 ff. 
3. Carroll, ~. £!l., p. 365. 
When news that the raid was started reached 
Europe, Berlin instructed Count Hatzfeldt, the 
40 
German Ambassador at London, to inquire if the 
British Government sanctioned the raid. l Marschall 
laid down a flat principle that Germany would not 
tolerate the annexation of Trsnsvaal. 2 He informed 
the new British Ambassador, Lascelles, that in spite 
of repeated warnings of the danger of incurring 
German illwill in South Africa, England did not pay 
the least bit of attention. 3 Salisbury and Hatzfeldt 
informad Berlin via Lascellee that there was no 
official endorsement of the raid. Salisbury did 
this even before its outcome was known.' Nevertheless, 
a formal note of protest was sent from Berlin. The 
German Ambassador was instructed to ask for his pass-
port if he received an impression that the raid was 
authorized in London. At the same time Germany 
sounded out France to eee if she would cooperate 
(temporarily) with Germany in stopping England. The 
purpose of this gesture was to make England again 
1. Brandenburg, .2R,. cit., p. 83. 
2. Tilley's Memorandum, !.~. , I, 326. 
3. William II to Marschall, January 1, 1896, 
G.P. , XI, No. 2514. 
4. Seton-Watson, !.p.. ~., p. 676. 
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realile the danger of isolation and the need of 
joining the Triple Allianoe. l A request had been 
made of Portugal for permission to send a detaoh-
ment of German troops to maroh through Portuguese 
African te~itory to Pretoria, Transvaal for the 
proteotion of German subjects. This request was 
denied by the portuguese minister, Marquis de Soveral. 
Acoording to Eckardstain, Hatzfeldt's assistant at 
London, thi s one ge sture did more th ... anything a1 •• 
to prevent an outbreak of war between England and 
~rm8l17.2 A pa •• age of troops before England oould 
have retrieved the situation, might have started a 
juggernaut, whioh oould not be stopped even after 
the primary oause, the raid, had been proven to be 
independent of governmental sanotion. 
News soon oame through that the raiders had 
been oaptured and that the danger to Transvaal was 
over for the time being. Immediately the German 
government sourried about to retrieve a situation 
that could have been dangerous in spite of the fail-
ure of the raid. A telegram was flashed to Hatzfeldt 
to request the return of the note of protest. 
1. Brandenburg, .2R.. oit., p. 83. 
2. Eokardete in , Baron von, Ten Years!! !a! 
Court 2£ Saint Jame. 1895-1905, pp:-!4-S. 
Luckily this was possible because Salisbury was 
away and had not yet been able to open the note. l 
It was return. d to the somewhat embarrassed Germans. 
However, the sslvaging of this message was almost 
wasted effort, for in the next few days Germany 
performed one of the greatest diplomatic blunders 
of the century when she sent the famous congratu.la-
tory telegram to President Krueger. 
The failure of the raid was in a sense a 
disappointment for the Kaiser and his government. 
If the raid had been suocessful and oould have been 
attributed to England, Germany would have had some 
oause for the establishment of a proteotorate over 
the Transvaal. This might have been one of the 
reasons why Germany at this time approaohed her 
erstwhile enemy, france, and also Russia t for 
possible support. She ooUld make temporary use of 
her European rivals beoause of their indignation at 
the raid. However, the French aaw through this 
easily enough. 2 Germany went so far as to offer 
Krueger a proteotorate on January 2, 1896.3 Dr. 
1. Brandenburg, .2R,. olt., p. ai. 
2. Seton-Watson, ~. oit., p. 578. 
3. Lovell, ~. cit., p. 369. Lovell bases hie 
statement on Konran-Lebman's aooount of a Memorandum 
by Lieutenant Mesmer-Selden, one time German Military 
Fredri ch ThilIlJle, one 0 f the e di tor 8 c f the Gro 88e 
Politik in an article, "Die Xrugerdepsche,tt haa 
stated that Transvaal had feared the establishment 
of a German Proteotorate before the Jsmeson episode 
made suoh an action possible or more desirable to 
the Boers. l Wilhelm even offered Dr. Leyds. Boer 
Representative-at-Large in Europe, military help 
and added "if Lorenzo Marques (Portuguese Mozambique's 
-
port of entry and chief source of Boer suppli.s) ever 
ohanged owners. it oould only oome into German O~ 
Boer handa .,,2 
HoweTer. Salisbury's "oorrect attitude" hal 
oheated Germany of any reasonable pretext for further 
intervention at this time.! Nevertheless, the Kaiser, 
at least, felt that something must be done. So on 
January 3, 1896, a meeting was called in Berlin whioh 
was attended by the Kaiser; Hohenlohe. the Imperial 
Chanoellor; Marsohall, the Foreign Minister; and Dr. 
Ittaohe at Constantinople. This Mimorandum Is quoted 
in Chanoellor Hohenlohe's Memoirs. Lebm&ri'. article 
anie Vorgesahichte der Krugerdepsche" appeared in 
Archiv ~ Politik ~ _G~e_sc~h~i~c~h_t~et 1925. 
1. Lovell, ~. £li., p. 364. 
2. Seton-Watson. ~. ~.t p. 677. 
3. Brandenburg • .2l? • .2.!i •• p. 84. 
Kaiser, the Colonial seoretarr~l Likewise, 
Seoretarr of state for the Navr Rollman, Commanding 
Adm.irsJ. Knorr t and Chief of Naval Cabinet Benden 
were present. 2 The Kaiser made some verr interest-
ing, if not fantastic, suggestions which Marschall 
explained in his disrr. 
Janu8.rr 3rd. At 10 o'clook oonferenoe with 
R.M. • •• R.M. unfolded somewhat astonishing 
projeots. A protectorate OTer the Transvaal, 
but I talked him out of that at once. Mobiliza-
tion of the Marine Infantrr. The dispatoh of 
troops to the Transvaal. And upon the Chan-
cellor's objection: 'That would mean war with 
England,'· R.M. replied, 'Yes, but onlr on 
land.' Then it was resolved to send Soheele 
(Colonel Baron von Sch.ele, Governor of German 
East Africa until February 1895) to the Trans-
vaal to reconnoitre. Also an unfortunate idea. 
F1nallr R.M. at ~ suggestion sent a qongratu-
latorr dispatch to PreSident Krueger. 3 
The telegram was finally sent then as the cabinet's 
war out of a dilemma. It was in Brandenburg's words 
"a sort of lightning oonductor for the Kaiser's 
energ7 ... , The final meS sage i tee If was drafte d by 
Marsohall. but it was far from being hie own wish 
and idea as the Kaiser later accused. Marschal16 
1. :Brandenburg, ,2,E. oit., p. 84. 
2. Hsmmall9,.2£- ill., p. 68. 
3. ll.!:.! •• pp. 68-9. 
4. Brandenburg, n· cit. , p. 84. -
5. HammsIDh!Ro- ill., p. 67. 
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was merely following a line of aotion whioh would 
be the least of seTeral evils. He was even obligated 
to alter several worda in the original message 
written by Herr Kaiser, the Colonial Seoretary, to 
suit the Kaiser. l The words oongratulating Krueger 
for ~preserving the respeot for your government" 
were ohanged to "preserving the independenoe of the 
oountry against ~ttaok from outside."2 The full 
message reads as follows: 
I express to you mw sino ere oongratulationa 
that you and your people, without appealing to 
the aid of friendly powers, have sueoeeded, by 
your own energetio aotion against the armed 
bands Which invaded your country as disturbers 
of the peace t in restoring peace and in maintain-
ing the independence Of the country against 
attaoks from without. 3 
This was an improvement over suoh original fantastio 
suggestions as having Germany deolare war on English 
South Afrioa and remain at peaoe with England at the 
same time or to get France to oooperate with Germany 
in frightening England in a war overseas. Neverthe-
less, the message still oontained enough ~ite to 
ohange the opinion of the English' publio toward 
1. Carroll, ~. oit., p. 369. 
2. Brandenburg, ~. £!i., p. 85. 
3. Langer, W. L., Diplomacy ~ Imperialism, 
I, 237. 
Germany to one of definite hostility. The last 
phrase of the message was a plain endorsement of 
the Transvaal's claim to complete independence. 
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This was contrary to the London conTention of 18811 
whioh recognized England's sovereignty over the 
external affairs of the Dutch African Republics of 
Transvaal and the Orange Free state. The telegram, 
a greater blunder than the raid ever was, threw a 
shadow over Anglo-German relations which subsequently 
grew dsrker. 2 Salisbury frankly told Eckardstein 
that it was silly from the point-of-view of German 
interests.! The insanity of the situation was 
realized all too well by Hatzfeldt whO contemplated 
reSigning as a result of the blunder and the 
irreparable damage it had done to British-German 
relations.' His only reason for staying on waa to 
"make gOOd as far as possible the harm done. w5 
The Jameson Raid and the M'rican 8i tuation 
in general were indications to some Englishmen that 
t. Carroil, ~. ill., p. 362. 
2. Seton-Watson, ~. £!i., p. 6'18. 
3. Eckardstein, ~. ill· , p. 85. 
4. Ibid. , p. 87. -
6. Ibid. t p. 87. -
England was in need of an ally. Among these was 
Joeeph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary in Salis-
bury's seoond oabinet. Chamberlain was oonvinoed 
that "Splendid Isolation" was a bankrupt polioy.l 
England had hardly a single friend. Something had 
to be done quiokly. She desperately needed allies 
who would work for peace. Chamberlain and Arthur 
Balfour, aoting as Prime Minister in his unol., 
Lord Salisbury's, absence, oonsidered that, despite 
the numerous Anglo-German differenoes, Germany would 
be the most logioal oandidate for possible partner-
ship in a defensive allianoe2 sinoe most of the 
differenoes between the two oountries were stlll in 
the stage of annoyanoes. Chamberlain was oonvinoed 
that an ally was absolutely necessary. He did not 
believe that an alliance with even Russia and Franoe 
was impossible.5 However, he was moreoonvinoed that 
England's differenoes with Germany, partioularly 
oolonial, were not nearly as divergent as with other 
powers. Consequently, Chamberlain began to make in-
quiries as to the possibility of some kind of allianoe 
1. Garvin, ~. oit., III, 254. 
2. Brandenburg, !.R.. ill.., p. 106. 
3. Garvin, !R. !!l., III, 255. 
wi~b England. But, his negotiations were not 
officially those of the cabinet. Henoe, they were 
regarded as a private matter. l Through the inter-
mediary of Baron Eckardstein, the German Ambassador'. 
Assistant in London and an old acquaintance ot 
Chamberlain's, a meeting with Hatzfeldt. the Ambassa-
dor, was arranged. 2 The meeting ooourred March 29, 
1889. At this time it was unoffioially proposed that 
England might not only reaoh an understanding but 
even oonclude a defensive allianoe with Germany.3 
This is substantiated by Hatzfeldt.' 
Here Gel"Dl&IlY at last had in her handS what 
Bismarck had desired and What he had striven for 80 
hard in the last years of his ministry--an alliance 
with England. 5 On the surface at least this was what 
Germany wanted or thought she wanted in 189&.6 
1. BritiSh D8cumentB, Vol. I, Foreword. Also 
Chamberlain'. Memorandum, larch 29, 1898, Garvin, 
~. ~., III, 259-60. 
2. Garvin, ~. £!i., pp. 255-256. 
3. {bil.' p. 260. 
March 29, 8,. 
Chamberlain's Memorandum of 
4. Hatzfeldt to Bulow, G.P., XIV, pt. It --196-199. 
5. Ha.u:unanv.,.!Ut. ill., PP. 24 ff. 
6. Supra, pp. 3'-38. 
r 
However, now that she had the possibility of 
securing what she wanted, she let it go beoause 
she thought she oould get even better terms in 
view of England's predioament. She was skeptical, 
with some justifioation, for just a few months 
before a similar proposal bad been made to the 
Tsar.1 Then, too, the favored Navy program of the 
Kaiser was now beginning to displace IIlaIlY of the 
older ideas and polioies. Another distraoting 
factor was the unoffioial nature of the proposals 
from a responsible oabinet. Bulow, the German 
Minister of State, said that he oould not trust the 
unoertainty and unreliability of England's parlia-
mentary government. 2 Likewise, Bulow objeoted to 
suoh an arrangement on the grounds if suoh a treaty 
were made by Germany I1we must oome to the assistanoe 
of England Whenever she was attaoked in India or 
Canada or in 80me other of her numerous colonies and 
overseas possessions, while England remained with 
grounded arms if Russians marched against Austria or 
the Frenoh against Italy.n3 Strangely enough, the 
1. G.P. t XIV t 243. --
2. Bulow, Prinoe Bernhard, Memoirs, I, 380. 
3. Ibid., p. 379. 
Kaiser, too, was instrumental in oreating the dead-
look. The British overtures were, he told the Tsar 
"by my oommands oooly and dilatorily answered in a 
colourless manner."l 
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Salisbury, the Prime Minister, upon his return 
from France, where he had been resting beoause of his 
health, was probably happy that Chamberlain's suggest-
ions had not been more productive. He later told 
HatBfeldt that while he agreed with Chamberlain in 
abstract in desiring a rapprochement with Germany, he 
did not favor a formal alliance or treaty neoessary 
until a speoifio oase of neoessi ty arose. 2 _Salisbury 
had not yet been oonvinoed that "splendid isolation" 
should be given up. He was in truth the "residuary 
legatee of the system of Castlereagh.,,3 However, the 
"ice had been broken." Both powers seemed to agree 
• • • that the most important task of both govern-
ments was gradually to dispel the ill-humour still 
prevailing between the two oountries, by showing 
a spirit of aooommodation in minor questions, and 
thus to prepare publio opinion on both sides for 
a definite political agreement.4 
1. Nicholson, 2l?,- cit., p. 9.4. 
2. HammaJ1l.,.2,£. oit-, p. 79. 
3. Ceoil, Algernon, British Foreign Seoretaries, 
"Salisbury," p_ 30t. 
4. Hamman", !E.. ill., p • 79 • 
Chamberlain as late as June 2, was still reported 
by Hatzfeldt as desiring "to work by leisurely but 
friendly efforts for an alliance with Germany and 
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so to act that the way was left open for any under-
standing later on.nl Salisbury's unrelenting 
reluctance to entertain seriously talk of a complete 
alliance with Germany was based on his suspicion 
that Ger~ dangled the prospect of such an alliance 
before England just enough to keep her interested in 
times of difficulty. Germany did this merely t. 
wrangle oolonial concessions from England and Dot tc 
realize the purported purpose--a permanent under-
standing resulting from an alliance. 2 
The German Ambassador continued to disouss 
the question academically with Salisbury with the hope 
that something oould be gained for Germany in the 
future. 3 It so ha.ppened that the "future" was just 
a little over a month away and the "something that 
oould be gained" was the Portuguese colonies. 
Thus by June 1898 the English Government had 
oome to a partial realization of its adverse situation 
1. Ratzfeldt Report of June 2 and 3, G.P. XIV, 
240. --
2. Brandenburg, 2R.. oi t., p. 145. -
3. Ibid. t p. 114. -
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of "splendid isolation." England was in danger of 
being without friends at a time when her own oolonial 
problems were becoming acute in South Africa. To 
forestall any embarrassment in the growing diffioul-
ties, England indicated that she would posSibly bow 
to ciroumstances and seek aid Bmong her rivals·and 
potential enemies; at the time Germany was the most 
logical one from whom to secure such aid. 
CHAPTER III 
STEPS TOWARD AN ANGLO-GERMAN 
COLONIAL AGREEMENT 
CHAPTER III 
STEPS TOWARD AN ANGLO-GERMAN 
COLONIAL AGREEMENT 
Chamberlain's initial efforts to establish a 
regular allianoe between GermaDJ and England proved 
unsuocessful beoause of German distrust of England, 
German indeoision as to whether she should turn more 
to Rus sia or Engl and for added supportl and the un-
enthusiastio attitude of the Salisbury element in 
the British Cabinet. Nevertheless, both pawers left 
the baok door open.! Germany indioated that While a 
large soale understanding was impossible, there was 
still a possibility for a settlement of speoific 
minor matters. 3 This apparently oonformed to Salis-
bury's views as expressed to Baron Staal. Russian 
ambassador, when he was inquiring as to the rumored 
possibility of an Anglo-German alliance. At this 
time the BritiSh Prime M1nister replied, "Allianoe 
(with Germany) non; rapproohement oui."' Consequently. 
1. Bran4enbur g, .2:e.. 0 it •• pp. 113 ff. 
2. SUpra, Ch. II, pp. 6l-62. 
3. Bulow to Hatlfeldt, June 8, 1898, g,.F.. XIV. 
No. 251. 
4. Hamma.n~) .2R.. ill·. p. 80. 
5' 
the stage was well set in 189B for speoific negotia-
tions for the eventual disposal of Portuguese 
colonial possessions, particularly in Africa where 
there was such a duplioation of German and English 
interests. Aooording to Hamman, Germany realized 
that the proximity of Portuguese possessions in 
Africa to Transvaal, German East Africa, German 
South West Africa and the BritiSh South African 
possessions provided ample opportunity for embarrass-
ing oomplications. The Reich soon conceived the idea 
of avoiding hostile complioations by means of an 
Anglo-German agre~ment ooncerning Afrioa. l fhis, 
however, plaoed Germa~ on the horns of a dilemma--
how was she to oome to en agreement With England in 
Africa and yet not give up rights and possessions 
of her own? EVidently, a catalyst, lightning 
conductor, or scape-goat was needed. 
The embarrassing condi tion of Portugue se 
finances by May, 189B, plus the growing strategio 
importanoe of the location of her colonies were coin-
oidentally opportune for the diplomatic ~arring of 
England and GerInaDy. By May of 189'8 Portugal was in 
1. Hamman,,!E.. oit. t p. so. 
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desperate nee d for money to meet not only the forth-
coming award of arbitration against her as a re8Ult 
of her oonfiscat1onl of British ra1lroad interests 
in Mozambique (East Africa), but even her ordinarJ 
debt engagement s, on whioh the payment of interest 
had been suspended.! 
So desperate was this need that the Portu-
guese government sent its Governor-General of 
Mozambique, Major Moushino de Albuquerque to Paris, 
L.ondon and Berlin to make soundings as to the di8-
position of these various governments. Portugal, 
at this time. :!!!..!!!!!. offer1ng !!!.!: colonies in 
Afr10a for sale or as e collateral for a loan.8 This --- - _ .......... --. - - ---- - -----
v1sit by MOushino proved a revelation to him of the 
mili tart sm that pervaded Germany. He, as governor 
of MOzambique, the nearest non-British neighbor of 
the German favori te, Transvaal, saw danger to hi8 
country from Germany. So "he determined that hi. 
country should maintain the best possible relations 
w1th Germany and the Transvaal compat1ble with a 
1. Ir. Bertie i s Memorandum on England and 
Portugal in Africa, May 1. 1898, B.D. It No. 65. - -
2. Hamman~,~. ~ •• p. 82. 
3. Ibid., p. 82. 
cl08e understanding with England.-l Consequently, 
concurring with the Marquis d8 Soveral, longtime 
Portuguese statesman and Ambassador to London in 
1898, he thought that his government should adopt 
a suggestion from England. That 1s, that a loan 
should be raised in England on the guarantee of 
revenue. of the Portuguese colon1es, including 
Lorenso Marques, "ooupl.' With a thorough under-
standing with Her-Majesty's government.-! 
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This gesture, more favorable to England than 
the other powers, was in keeping w1 th Portugal' 8 
allCient friendship with Eng land 3 and the Treaty of 
preemption that she had signed wi th Por1lzgal in 
1875, granting her prior rights to purohase Kozsm-
b1que if Portugal were disposed to 8e11 it.' How-
ever, it could p1que Germany, who because of the 
proxim1 ty of Mozambique to German East Africa 811d 
the Boer Republic, believed it to be in her sphere 
of innuence by the r1ght of justioe if not by law. 
In fact, alrea~ during the Jameson crisis, the 
x. bertie's Memorandum on England and • 
Portugal in Afrioa, !.!., I, 46. 
2. Ibid., p. 46. 
3. Supra, Ch. I. 
".Supra, Ch. I, pp. 17-18. 
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Kaiser himself admitted that Germany was out to get 
Lorenzo Marques, Mozambique's ohief port. l Chamber-
lain strongly suspeoted Germany of having deeigna 
on this locality as late as 1898. 2 
Thus even before 1898, Germanyts newl, arouse! 
colonial ambitions prompted her to take advantage of 
Portugal's precarious pecUDiar,y situation. She 
Showed herself extremely interestea. to furnish credit 
guaranteed by the oustoms ot Angola, llozambique, ana. 
Timor.! The Portuguese colonies were not only tempt-
ing prizes, but were also exasperating inconveniences 
to German Afrioan policy; the role Portugal played by 
refusing transmit to German troops during the JamesoXl 
orisis was proof. 
The German government lost no time in bringing 
pressure to bear on England. Although the German 
Empire had Shown an interest in the Portuguese 
coloniea as early as the Jameson situation, it was 
partioularly anxious to secure oonoessions in Portu-
guese Africa after the Moushino mission gave glaring 
1. Hammen" / .9.P.. e 1t., pp. 70-71. 
2. Count Hatzfeldt to the German Foreign Offioe, 
June 14, 1898, Dugdale, E.T.S., German Dijfomatio Doo~­
menta 18'10-1914, p. 21; Also .f!.l.., XIV, 2 .• 
3. Guedes, Armando Marques, Alianca Ingle.s, 
p. Z25. 
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indication of Portuguese finanoes. On June 3, 1898, 
the Kaiser indicated, on marginal nete. on the report 
of Hatzfeldt (the German Ambassador to London) to the 
Foreign Office, that Ger.man colonial interests 
demanded oonsideration of the aoquisition of 80me o~ 
Portugal's African possessions. l 
Therefore, on June 6, 1898 when Count Tatten-
baoh, German :Minister to Lisbon, learned that the 
Marquis Luis de Soveral had been sent to England with 
specific instructions to obtain money by mortgaging 
the revenues (not the sovereignty) of Mozambique, 
Angola and other Portugue se colonies, he telegraphed 
Berlin at once.! This information soon produced 
aotion, for on June 14, 1898, Hatzfeldt oalled on 
Salisbury and made some roundabout inquiries as to 
what Sovaral was proposing.3 Salisbury was evasive. 
However, he indioated that the problem had bee. re-
ferred by h~ to the Colonial Seoretary, Joseph 
Chamberlain. He promised Hatzfeldt that be would 
1. DUgdale, I.T.S., ~. cit., Bernhard TOB 
Bulow in Berlin to Count HatZfeTri, June 8, 1898, III, 
21-28. Also G.!. XIV, 261. 
2. Ibid., p. 27, editorial note. 
3. Salisbury to Viscount Gough, June 14, 1898, 
!.~., I. 48. 
I' 
inform Germany in due time if steps were undertaken 
in referenoe to the Portuguese colonies which would 
ooncern the legitimate rights and interests of 
Gerlll8ll7. Salisbury was comple tely aware of German 
sensitiveness in African matiers. l He had learned 
that too well during the Jameson Raid crisis. He 
was eager to keep Germany placated. 
According to hie own report of the conversation, 
Hatzfeldt said he 
• • • explained in friendly. but emphatic terms 
that one-sided action 1n the matter here lnvolT1ns 
actual or contemplated passing of Portugal' 8 
sovereign rights in those oolonies into Br1ti&h 
hand s wo uld make a very bad 1m.pres 8i on Wi th us 
and also would not tend to ~prov. our relations 
whioh we both deaired. and that the question was a 
politioal one, whioh he, Sali.b~, and not 
Chamberlain would have to decide.~ 
T.he gauntlet was def~nitely down. However, Bulow must 
haTe believed that there was a strong possibility of 
being able to persuade or foree England to enter into 
a joint negotiation, beoause when the French ambassador 
asked if he (Bulow) had any information on a pOSSible 
Anglo-Portuguese negotiation~ he replied in a deprecia-
ting tone. 3 Nevertheless, he wae careful to inolude 
1. Brandenburg t .2P.,. cIt ... p. 11i. 
2. Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office, June 14, 189&. 
Dugdale, E.T.S., ~. ~ ... III, 29; aleo ~.!. XIV, No.261. 
3. Bulow to Hatzfeldt, June 1', 1898, Dug4al., 
B.T.S.,.2.2. • .£ll. ... III, 50; Also G.l. XIV, 261h 
in informatiou telegraphed to Hatzfeldt. the 
suggestion that if England knew that Pranoe waa 
interested, she (England) would negotiate muoh more 
readily with Germany. ~he next meeting between 
Salisbury and Hatzfeldt brought out more specifio 
comments. Hatzfeldt asked if England would join 
wi th Germany in a CODUOOn aotion on the financial 
negotiations Portugal was requesting. Salisbury 
said the Government 
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••• considered any financial dealiDg betwefln 
us and Portugal a matter whioh exolu8iTely OOB-
oerned the two powers in question • • • I di4 
not think • • • that the,. negotiations ooUld 
form the subjeot of diplomatio oommunioation 
between Her Majesty's Government and the German 
government .1 __ 
SUoh an attitude. if allowed to oontinue. 
would soon make it possible for England to present a 
fait aooompli before Germany could even get a chanoe 
to present her oa88. Consequently, von Bulow 
immediately telegraphed Hatzfeldt an outline of 
Germany's position in the affair. The sum and sub-
stanoe of this message was that willy-nilly Germany 
was going to get something out of the Portuguese 
situation. Bulow veiled his materialistio outlook 
very thinly when he wrote, 
1. Marquess of Salisbury to viscount Gough. 
June 21, 189S, B.D., I, no. 67. - -
------------------ ----,---"- - ----,-" 
For us as well as for Ellgl811d in this matter 
as in all oolonial matters in general, it is 
an affair not 80 muoh of provable rights, but 
of interests and the power available for 
establishing these interests, if need be. l 
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His arguments went on to prove that although Germ8ll7 
laoked the assurance of naval strength that England 
had to assure her of independent action, ahe con-
trolled the European balance in such a way that should 
make things extremely embarrassing for England if 
that oountry refused to allow Germany to push her way 
into the negotiations. Then, too. he in41cate' that 
GermaDi should be given some reciprooity for the 
support ahe had given to England t s ES'1Ptian polio,.. 
In faot. if Germany di4 not get muoh reCiprocity, ahe 
might be made to appear the fool and the Government 
would 108e prestige both at home and abroad. In this 
event Germany would be forced to sct with energy. So 
it would be obe aper for England to come along quiet11 
and agree from the first. I: Bulow was anxious to 
oo~t England as quiokly aa pOSSible, for although 
Portugal had refused England's oonditions for the loan 
on June 20th, he felt that the finanoial condition of 
1. Bilow in Gerlin to Ratzfeldt, June 22. 1898, 
Dugdale, E.T.S., !!. oit., III, 32; also i.!., XIV, 278. 
2'12. 
2. ]Ulow to Hatzfeldt, June 22, 1898, ~.~., XIV, 
6! 
the Portuguese government would soon force it to 
capitulate. l He did not wan~ this to happen before 
Germany could get an opportunity to participate in 
the negotiations. !ben too, he was anxious becauae 
he felt that France was eager to gain something at 
this time from the Portuguese situation. In faot 
Bulow's anxiety over possible French interference ex-
tended until August, the last month of negotiations.! 
In spite of the German attitude--if not intimi-
dation--and in spite of a desire to consider German 
sensitiveness, salisbury was fundamentally concerned 
tha t the Portuguese Empire should not break up if 
anything could be done to save it. 3 In fact, thi8 was 
1_ Ealow to Hatzfe1dt, June 22, 1S9S, G.t- tIf, 
2. Baron von Richthofen to Count Hatzfeldt, 
August 12, 189S, Dugdale, E.T.S., ~. Cit., III, 3'. 
3. Dugdale, Blanche, Arthur James Balfour, I, 
266-7. This fear of Jrance 1s somewhit &mns1ng; Von 
Bulow himself created the 8ituation. At the same time 
that Germany was sounding out England ill early June 
for the possibility of joint action on the Portuguese 
colonial question, Von Bulow was sounding out France 
to 8ee if she woUld act Jointly with Germany on the 
same question. Von Bulow to Count Minister in Paris. 
June 18th, 1898, Dugdale, E.T.S., ~_ Cit., 111,30-31. 
This was to be a type of hedging in oa'S8Eilgland would 
not cooperate. Hanotaux, Foreign Minister in the 
Meline Ministry appeared to be interested. However, 
before anything conorete was accomplished the Meline 
Ministry resigned. It was succeeded by the Brisson 
Cabinet in which Delcasse was Foreign Minister. Del-
oasse definitely did not approve of anything resembling 
Franco-German collaboration. The "danger" of French 
"interference" cea.ed. 
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Salisbury's attitude throughout the Portuguese con-
versations and negotiations; while Germany was 
interested in securing spoil, he was chiefly 
interested in not antagonizing Germany and yet not 
offending Portuguese susceptibilities. l Brandenburg, 
expreesiDg somewhat the German viewpoint, concede. 
that England had no desire to hasten the dissolution 
of the Portuguese Empire. 2 Hamman i8 of a similar 
view. 3 Von Eckardstein, Hatzfeldt's assistant in 
London at the time of the negotiations, believes that 
the whole situation was hypothetioal.4 Bulow on the 
other hand gives indioation throughout his aocount of 
the negotiations that he was strictly interested in 
what he could get out of the situation in a material 
way.5 Portugal's susceptibilities and the possibility 
of conoluding a lasting understanding with England 
were not oonsidered. He probably oonsidered bucoan-
neering the oolonies from the very first. 6 Ironically 
1. DUgdale, Blanche t kthur :Tames Es!!our, It 
26'. 
2. Brandenburg, !E.- .2..li., p. 117. 
3_ Hamman",,2,E. • .ill., p. 83. 
4. Eokardstein, ,2;2 • .ill., p. 182. 
5. Bu.low t ,2E.. ~. t I, 320 ff. 
6. GarVin, .2:£e ill,., III, 321. 
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enough the German Government through Bulow main-
tained a polioy that was moat suooinotly expressed 
by Salisbury in a speeoh in Albert Hall, May 4, 1898. 
He said then, 
You may roughly divide the nations of the world 
as the living and dying .. • • the weak state. 
are becoming weaker, the strong states are be-
ooming stronger • • • the living will gradual17 
encroaoh on the territory of the dying ••• 1 
Germany. with her colonial appetite brought into full 
spate by the Weltpolitik philosop~, was evident17 
resolved to have her share of the world even if sh. 
had to take it from the dying and give them ali ttl. 
help in the pro~ess of dying. 
Portugal was made all too cognizant of her 
predioament, not only b.J the Bnstere paternalism of 
England, but also by the blunt diplomaoy of Germany. 
On June 22, 1898 the British Government was informed 
by Soveral that the Kaiser had sent the King of 
Portugal 8uoh an urgent message that the King had to 
rush baok to Lisbon and grant an audienoe to the 
German Minister (Tattenbaoh}.2 Tattenbaoh 8aid that 
the Kaiser could not continue on amioable terms With 
Portugal if the negotiations for a loan from England 
1. Garvin. 1£. olt., III, 281. 
2. Salisbury to Sir H. MaoDonell, June 22, 
1898, B.D., I. No. 68. --
-
65 
were oontinued without due regard to the legitimate 
interests of Germany. At this time the Portuguese 
Government was still anxiously trying to get the best 
deal it could from England without unduly offending 
Germany and Franoe. l 
The Portuguese government asked England what 
to do in reference to the German pressure. England 
informed Portugal that it depended on how badly ahe 
wanted the money. However, insofar as the intimida-
tion was conoerned, Salisbury 8sid that Germany had 
no right to interfere with the negotiations that were 
being discussed between Portugal and England. In 
reply to the Portuguese inquiry at this time as to 
what was England's attitude toward the "Ancient 
treaties," England replied the. t it was the same as 
that expressed in Lord Granville's note to the British 
Ambassador in reference to a similar request in 1875. 2 
It should be observed, however, that the 1873 note 
made no mention of colonial territory. On the whole, 
the English attitude in the reply to Soveral's 
inquiries aeemed slightly 0001. 
!he next day SaliB~u.ry seemed to be a little 
1. Salisbury to sir. H. VaoDOnel1, June 29, 
1698, B.D., It No. 71. --
2. Supra, Ch. I, p. 16. 
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more reoeptive toward German suggestions for a 
joint loan based on colonial revenues and on ulti-
mate possibility of assuring sovereignty of allotted 
colonies if the Pcrtugue se should default on the •• 
loans.1 Soveral approaohed Salisbury again on the 
twenty-ninth with a suggestion that 8.000,000 pounds 
be lent to Portugal, 2.000,000 of whioh would b • 
• eoured by revenne. from MOzambique; 6.000,000 of 
which would be seoured by customs from Portugal it-
self. Salisbury intimated "that the advantages to 
us did not appear to be very great ... 2 There was a 
definite attitude o~ reservation here. 
By June 30th, Mr. Bertie, A.8sistant Under-
secretary for Foreign Affairs t had prepared an offi-
cial memorandum based "on the assumption that Her 
Majesty's Government are disposed to admit the 
participation of Germany. but to «xclude that of 
France in the arrangements for the relief of Portugal 
from her present embarrassments •••• n He conoluded 
his c01DIlBnts with the ominous promise, stating: 
If for political reasons it is necessary to 
oome to terms with "Germny we might have wi th her 
1. SaliSbUry to Vi8count Gough, I.A., I, No. 70. 
2. Salisbury to Sir H. MacDonell, !.~., I, 
Ho. '11. 
an exchange of secret notes undertaking that 
whenever, if ever t the 'break-up of Portugal 
from internal oauses should oome about GermaDJ 
shall reoeiTe oertain specified portions of 
the spoil. l 
This was the essence of the entire agreement oon-
oluded in August. 
On July 6, aooording to Hatzfeldt, Salisbury 
himself began disoussion on the Portuguese question 
and as sured him "thB. t he Was by no means refusing to 
oome to an understanding with us on it."2 There is 
no reoord of this oonversation in the _Br_i_t_i_sh_~-
menta. In faot. there is no reoord in any of the 
Foreign Office Arohives.3 By July 9, Salisbury was 
disoussing speoifios With Hatzfeldt. With no violent 
objections he listened to Hatzfeldt1s suggestions of 
probable lines of division and distribution of shares 
of the Portuguese Afrioan Empire. He said, "I told 
Count Hatzfeldt I would plaoe the negotiations before 
~ oolleagues on TUesda7."4 However, he still 
1. Memorandum by Ir. Bertie, June SO, lS98, 
!.~ .. I, No. 72. 
2. Hatzfeldt to German Foreign Office, July 6, 
1898 (cipher telegram), !!.l., XIV, 281. 
3. Editor's Note, B.D., I, 55. --
4. Salisbury to Visoount Gough, July 9, 1898, 
1}. • .:Q., I, No. 74. 
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impressed upon Hatzfeldt that he oould not, for fear 
of Frenoh mischief-making, consent to an agreement 
which would have the effeot of wounding the feelings 
of the Portuguese, and giving them the impression 
that the English were watching for the downfall of 
Portugal. In the same statement in whioh he said that 
he would present the metter officially to his cabinet 
he still voiced his reluctance to sell an old friend 
into bondage. He said, "The difficulty will be a form 
of note which would not look like cutting up Portugal 
while atill alive."l However, he was now speaking of 
a note a8 a foregone oonclusion. 
The die was cast. An agreement was ul time. tel,. 
to be made by two external parties--Germany and 
Britain--for the possible ultimate division between 
them of a third party's insecure colonial possessions, 
the Portuguese colOnies. Based on surface indications 
such an arrangement could best be described by Sir 
Arthur Nicholson, First Lord Carnock's statement. He 
desoribed it as "the most cynical business in ~ whole 
experience of diplomaoy."2 Already by July 6, 1898 
1. salisbury to viscount Gough, JUly 9, 1898, 
!.~.t I, No. 74. 
2. Nioholson, ~. ~., p. 285. 
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England had, aooording to surface indications, left 
oonsiderations of Portugal aside. No reply was mad. 
to Portugal's final capitulation to Salisbury's terms 
for a loan.1 These terms would have given England--
independent of German collaboration--a voice in the 
administration of Delagoa Bay. 
By July 1898, then, Great Britain despite her 
anoient friendship for Portugal and despite qualms of 
consoience was ready to make a deal to share in the 
eventual spoils of her deoadent friend's Empire. Eng-
land, to be sure, was not entirely to blame, beoause 
Portugal made the first overture earlier in the year 
to raise a lOaD, secured, if there was no other 
recourse, by the colonial revenues or possible sale. 
Nevertheless, Portugal did not intend to sacrifioe 
sovereignty over the oolonies as the contemplated 
Anglo-German deal oontemplated at this time. 2 Neither 
did England initiate the joint German-English negotia-
tion. Why then, notwithstanding Salisbury's qualms, 
did England finally agree to negotiate? This question 
oan not be fully answered at this state of disoussion, 
1. Sir lie MacDone1! to the Marquess of salis-
bur.y, July O. 1898, !.~., It No. 73. 
2. Salisbur,r to Sir H. MaoDonell, June 28, 1898, 
!.~., I, No. 68. 
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but the fundamental difference between the German 
and English viewpoint must be noted. Germany was 
considering an immediate dissolution of Portugal. 
England was hoping for her to continue as long as 
possible as she was. As long as Portugal stood--
weak or strong--what Germany planned could not occur. 
England probably was using an uncertain possibility 
of an eventuality 8S a basis of negotiation with 
Germany to hold Germany in check. Germany considered 
that such a possibility could be made quite kinetic 
by a willful Germany acting in conJunction with 
England. England maintained an attitude of reluct-
ance and hesi tanoy. Germany maintained an attitude 
of opportunism and action. Then. too, it should be 
noted that as late as July 13, Salisbury seemed to 
think that Portugal would be a member of the negotia-
tions. l As the negotiations developed he saw that 
Portugal was to be excluded. This fact probably con-
tributed to his dislike of the whole arrangement. 
which he more or less tried to side-step. 
From the evidence already displayed it oan 
1.' Salisbury to Viscount Gough, JUly 13, 1898, 
B.D •• I, No. 75. --
be said then that England finally agreed to suoh a 
paradoxical arrangement for political reasons, but 
she was always anxious that such an arrangement 




THE ANGLO-GERMAN TREATY OF 1898 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ANGLO-GERMAN TREATY O~ 1898 
The colonial understanding only tentativelY 
discussed before July 1898. now (July 1898) began to 
be more definite. Aotive negotiations took the place 
of suggestions and hints. Once England agreed to 
consider a settlement. the negotiations became merely 
protracted bargaining over who should eventually get 
what share of the Portuguese oolonies. The outcom. 
of this bargaining had two distinctly different 
aspeots. On paper it would seem that GerIIlBll7 secured 
the ftlion1s share." Aotually England won a brilliant 
diplomatic viotory at a time when such a victory was 
politically and militarily prioeless. 
~ermany first demanded all of Angola (Portu-
gue •• W.st Africa) and all of Mozambique north of the 
Zambezi River and east of the Shire River. This in-
cluded part of what was already English terri tory, 
Blantyre. In addition to this Germany desired the 
Portuguese island of Timor in the Orient. 
Salisbury was sure that the Kaiser was "bent 
on an agreement ~ some ~; but that, nevertheless, 
he was taking the opportunity to make larger demands 
than he was prepared to press. nl As long as 
Salisbury took part in the negotiations he main-
tained, in addition to his concern about "cutting 
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up Portugal alive," an unrelenting campaign to 
deflate the German demands to 8S low a point 8. 
possible. In fact, the Kaiser became so exasperated 
8t Salisbury's attitude that he had his mother write 
her mother, Queen Victoria, informing her that her 
Prime Minister was an obstacle to the understanding 
between England and Germany.2 
When Hatzfeldt returned to the Foreign Office 
on July 13 to Bee how his proposals of the ninth had 
been accepted by Salisbury's oolleagues, he found 
that a definite decision to oonsider negotiations 
had been msde. 3 However, the terms that Salisbury 
placed before Hatzfeldt left him ill-satisfied. At 
this stage of the negotiations Salisbury still 
assumed that Portugal would have a voioe in the 
decisions. To all appearances he was going On the 
assumption that Portugal still wanted money badly 
1. Salisbury to Viscount Gough, JUly 9, 1e9S, 
B.B,. , II, No. 74. 
2. Langer, !l2.. ·cit., II, 527. 
3. Salisbury to Viscount Gough, July 13, 1898, 
Ja.£. t I, No. 75. 
enough to be agreeable to a jOint loan instead of 
one to England slone. England' e counter proposals 
gave Germany substantially what she wanted in 
Mozambiqui. but only that portion of Angola south 
of the town of Egito. l England also wanted as a 
~ 9.ua ~ that Germany agree to Portugal's 
abandoning to England the railroad from LorenBo 
Marques as well as the Port itself. Salisbury still 
insisted that Portugal and her colonies should be 
maintained as long as possible and that no surrender 
of sovereignty be involved in the loans. Re suggested 
that preemptive rights be granted over those sections 
used as collateral respectively for Germany and Eng-
land. These preemptive rights were to go into effect 
only if mischance overtook Portugal to such an extent 
that she would be forced of her own accord to surrender 
her colonies. Late on the same afternoon that Salis-
bury informed Hatsfeldt that England was agreeable to 
a joint loan along the lines just described, the 
Portuguese Minister Marquis de Soveral called on 
Salisbury and delivered the following message: " ••• in 
view of all the difficulties with which the question of 
1. See map, Appendix F. 
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a loan was surrounded, his Government had decided 
in favour of leaving matters !a statu quo_"l 
According to Salisbury, Soveral explained that this 
decision involved the abandonment of all idea of a 
loan from the British or any other Government and 
also of any notion of altering the attitude of Great 
Britain or of Portugal towards any portion of the 
Portuguese possessions in Africa. 
This point-blank statement put a decidedly 
different interpretation on any further negotiation 
that might be oarried on, for now the negotiations 
would not inolude partioipation of the subjeot of 
the negotiations, Portugal. Portugal's refusal "to 
come along" was extremely embarraSSing because her 
precarious finances might even have initiated an 
international COmmiSSion of debt administration, 
which, of oourse, would have preoluded any diplomatio 
or oolonial schemes that either England or Garm8n7 
might have. Nevertheless, the negotiations continued 
without the blessing of Eortugal's presence or 
acquiesoence. On July 19, 1898 Hatzfeldt again called 
on Salisbury and expressed terms for an agreement 
1. Salisbury to sir H. MacDoneli, JUly 13, 
1898, !.!_, I, No. 76. 
which were very similar to those of July 9; he 
presented these in French in the tentative form of 
a treaty.l The next day Salisbury informed Ha~z­
feldt that the cabinet had fully considered the 
proposals and found that they were not entirely 
acceptable. f Above all things the British would 
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not give up certain territory of their own as well 
as the Portuguese territory. The Germans had pro-
posed to allow England to have the unrestricted 
right to control Delage a Bay and the Transvaal Bay 
in return for Blantyre (British territory), most of 
Mozambique, Angola and l1alfi8ch Bay (British terri-
tory). Salisbury explained that England already had 
preemptive rights over Delagoa Bay,3 hence Germany 
had no legal right to object before international 
law if England were to acquire this area independent 
of German cooperation. The British Prime Minister 
countered the German bid for British territory by a 
demand by England for Togoland, if Walfisch Bay were 
to be given up. This upset the German Ambassador 
1. SaliSbury to viscount Gough, Jilly 19, 1898, 
1!.E,. • I, No. 77. 
f. Salisbury to Viscount Gough, July 20, 1898, 
B.D., I, No. 78. 
3. SUEra, Ch. I, pp. 1'1-18. 
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immensely. He even threatened that Germany would 
have to turn to Russia if England would not give 
more concrete indications of a desire to become a 
friend of Germa~. Apparently Salisbury as a "master 
of public affairs" was trying to elude Hatzfeldt ae 
long as possible by various evasions. l On the other 
hand it was apparent that Germany considered herself 
in an excellent position to drive a good bargain. 
The negotiations continued for almost a month longer 
with Germany and England remaining at these two ex-
tremes. ~he tenor of the German negotiations in this 
affair as d •• oribed in the subsequent memoirs of the 
principle negotiations, is exceedingly mild in com-
parison to that expressed in the documents. Von 
Bulow's very general account of the episode would 
make it seem to be merely a trial of British fidelity 
which the treaty found to be laoking. 2 This viewpoint, 
however, is very easy to arrive at years after all of 
the events in the situation had taken the oourse 
destiDJ had designed. Eckardstein states that the 
negotiations were very bypothetical. 3 However, at the 
i. Guedes, ~. cit., p. 327. 
2. Bulow, ~. ~., III. 320-321. 
3. Eckardstein • .2£. ill.., p. 18.2. 
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time of negotiation it was evident that Germany was 
thinking in terms of definite objectives whioh oould 
be obtained beoause of the finanoial embarrassment 
of Portugal and diplomatio embarrassment of England. 
Between the twentieth of July and the twenty-
seventh, no official British records were made on the 
negotiations. Oa the twenty-seventh, the indomitable 
Hatzfeldt again appeared at the Foreign Office to 8ee 
if England was still Willing to oonolude a treaty 
with Germany in referenoe to the Portuguese coloniee. l 
Evidently when Berlin learned that the threat to 
appeal to England's old ene~, RUSSia, did not make 
Britain jump into Germany's arms, the Beich was 
willing to make a few concessions. Germany no longer 
brought in the extraneous matter of ceSSion of BritiSh 
territory contiguous to certain portuguese oolonial 
areas allotted by Germa~ to Germany. The demands for 
Blant,yre and Walfisch Bay were dropped as were 
(temporarily) the demands for Timor. However, in 
return for this concession Germany wanted more terri-
tory in Angola and Mozambique which formd an enola'Ve 
into British territory. Salisbury immediately stated 
1. Salisbury to sir F. Lasoe11es, !.~., I, 
No. 79. . 
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that this was not agreeable. These views were 
reiterated a week later when Hatzfeldt again reviewed 
the conversations. l Salisbury repeated his objections 
of July 27; whereupon Hatzfeldt suggested that in 
return for giving up demands for the enclaved terri-
tory between the Zembezi and Shire Rivers, Germany 
should receive more land in Angola. Salisbury again 
oountered with objeotions. First, he objeoted to 
the term "oompensation" used by Hatzfeldt in referenoe 
to oonoessions Germany wanted in Portuguese Afrioa 
from England in return to conoessions given to her. 
Then he indioated that the added territory Germany 
wanted in Angola would require that England at least 
be granted extra-territorial rights there in oase of 
an eventual Portuguese cession. 
Salisbury still was anxious to consider the 
suscepti bili tie s 0 f Portugal. He still gave the im-
pression that Portugal should be consulted and 
informed. He stated that if the arrangement were 
made between England and Germany "a great deal of 
drafting would be neoessary in order to prevent suoh 
stipulations from wounding the feelings or infringing 
1. Salisbury to Sir F. Lascelles, !.~., It 
No. 80. 
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upon the rights of Portugal. Itl He did not yet seem 
to think a secret arrangement was necessary. 
Hatzfeldt himself gave the best description 
of the Prime Minister's reactions when he said ItI 
realized that the Prime 1linister wishes at all oosta 
not to appear at Lisbon in the light of an expectant 
heir, dividing in advanoe the Portuguese heritage with 
another. n2 Perhaps it was more than a coinoidenoe 
that at this partioular point in the negotiations 
Salisbury decided to take a rest at his Frenoh villa 
at Dieppe. After August 10 he had turned all of the 
negotiations over to his nephew, Arthur Balfour, 
whom he left in oharge of the Foreign Offioe. 3 Balfour 
spent the next ten days in outting down the extra-
ordinary German demands so that an agreement oould be 
reaohed.' It is quite possible that between July 20, 
1898 when Salisbury was so cold to Hatzfeldt's 
suggestion and August 3 when he appeared reoonoiled 
to an agreement of some sort, part of his mixed 
1. S8iisDury to sir ~. Lascelies, JUly 27, 
1898, B.D., I, No. 80. - -
2. Hatzfeldt to German Foreign Offioe, August 8, 
1898, Dugdale, E.T.S., ~. ~., 111,36. 
3. Dugdale, Blanohe, ~. ~., 111,.267. 
4. Ibid., p. 267. -




cabinet had indicated a desire to make a deal involv-
ing possible infringement of Portuguese sovereignty. 
This he agreed to because of political reasons, 
although he did not approve personally. Then, too, 
he never relished the idea of an alliance or agree-
ment with Germany. The Chamberlain element was 
particularly desirous of an arrangement of friendship 
with Germany. This had, of cOUTse, been attempted 
earlier in the year by Chamberlain without enthusias-
tic support from Salisbury--who oddly enough was 
taking a short rest in France at that time too. 
The French Foreign Offioe is responsible for 
a similar interpretation, in reporting the situation 
from the viewpoint of the Marquis de Soveral of 
Portugal. l The Quai DIOrsay had the impression that 
when Salisbury realized that Portugal would have to 
pay the piper for the realization of an agreement of 
sorts with Germany he "retired to his Villa at Dieppe 
to avoid recrimination of the Marquis de Soveral--Afin ........... 
d'evlter!!! recriminations~! de Soveral, !! Marquis 
, 
1! Salisbury ~ rendit ~ ~ villa ~ Dieppe. w2 This 
1. M DeFleurian, Charge D'Affaires de Franoe 
a Londres a M. POincare, Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres, Londres, 2 Avril 1912, Documents Diploma-
ti~ues FrancaiS 1871-1914, 3 Serie 1911-1914. Tome 
Second. 8 Fevrler, 10 Mal 1912, No. 291, p. 297. 
2. Ibid., p. 297. 
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document states that Salisbury had defended himself 
but poorly when Soveral addressed observations of 
righteous indignation to him. There is nospecifio 
record of such a conversation in the British Docu-
ments. The Portuguese writer, Guedes, gives the 
impression that Soveral might have spoken to Salis-
bury about the pending Anglo-German deal. l However, 
Guedes bases some of his information on the French 
document s and consequently t cannot be relied upon as 
a completely independent source--especially since 
there was no official Portuguese documents published 
on this entire episode. 2 Brandenburg gives the 
1. Gue des t ,2.£ • .ili., pp. 327 fl. 
2. In a letter sent to the writer of this 
thesis on November 27, 1941. by Pedro don de Sousa 
Pernes. Attache to the Portuguese Legation in WaShing-
ton. D. C. the following information on portuguese 
material for this thesis was given: 
"The Minister has asked me to thank you for 
your letter of November 22nd, and to tell you that 
there has been no official 'White Book' published 
by the Portuguese Government on the subject of 
'The Anglo-German Negotiations over the Portuguese 
Colonies 1698-1914.' 
If you read Portuguese you may find something 
of interest in the book, nA Alianca Ingl.sa" by 
Armando Marques Guedes, published in Lisbon, 1938, 
pages 3~-27 • • • • 
Other references of interest can be found in 
Mr. Harold Nicholson's biography of his father, 
Lord Carnock. In this book you will find quota-
tions Which show the attitude of the British 
Foreign Office in regard to this whole question. R 
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impression that Salisbury wanted to wash his hands 
of the whole matter;l hence, the delegation of the 
task to his nephew. Then, too, Salisbury had evaded 
Germany as much as possible. When he finally saw 
that Germany could not be put off any longer he may 
have let someone else take the onus of responsibility 
and have given assurances in the meantime to the pro-
testing Soveral. Later in 1911 the Ambassador to 
Franoe, Sir Francis Bertie, wrote Sir Edward Grey the 
following interpretation of Salisbury's absence: 
(Bertie was Assistant Under Secretary of State in 
1898. ) 
• • • the negotiations had been begun by Lord 
Salisbury, who later on told Count Hatzfeldt, so 
the latter informed me, that he would not have 
signed the Agreement, to whioh the Ambassador 
retorted, so he said to me, that he (Lord Salis-
bury) certainly would have signed it for the 
Cabinet would have made him do so. 
Lord Salisbury had no affection for the 
Agreement, but that was, I think, partly because 
he had hoped to stave off the German Government 
and thought that his nephew had been too ready 
to conclude the negotiations. Besides this, in 
the latter days of Lord Salisbury'S time as 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, he and Arthur 
Balfour were not always at one and the uncle was 
rather jealous of the nephew in his marfagement 
of the Foreign Office during the unole's absence. 2 
1. Brandenburg, ~. ill., p. 116. 
2. Editorial note quoting a memorandum in Grey's 
MBs., Vol. 54, January 25, 1911, !.~., X, Pt. 2, No.268. 
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Bulow reports that Salisbury made a similar 
exouse to Hatzfeldt somewhat atter the agreement had 
been oonoluded. l 
Nevertheless, the faot remains that soon after 
Salisbu~'s sidestepping of the issues, a treaty Was 
oonoluded between Germany and England. When Balfour 
assumed oontrol, the Assistant Under-seoretary tor 
Foreign Affairs, submitted a memorandum to him to 
aoquaint him with the salient B~itish oonsiderations. 
In this note he still implied that the British oon-
sent to negotiations was based on the hypothesis "that 
the Portuguese Government will be willing to aooept 
the oooperation of Germany With England in providing 
money for Portugal, she giving in return reversionary 
rights over Portuguese territories to Germany and 
England." This was the Salisbury standpoint. The 
Memorandum oontinued with some observations that might 
explain Salisbury's previous evasiveness to Hatzfeldt: 
There are no indioations that the cooperation 
of Germany with England would be aoceptable to 
Portugal. On the contrary, she is well aware of 
the territorial and financial designs of Germany, 
end it wUl only be very great pressure and dire 
tinancial neoessity that will bring her to submit 
to the intervention of Germany in her affairs. 
M. de Soveral is strongly opposed to it, and urges 
that we should not tie our hands with Germany as 
1. Bulow, ~. oit., I, 484. 
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if we can postpone the question till the 
autumn--when we may be 18SS occupied elsewhere--
there i8 good prospeot of a change of government 
at Lisbon and a satisfactory settlement between 
England and Portugal. l 
Here i8 at beat indirect evidence of the conversation 
between Soveral and Salisbury referred to in the 
French Document8. 2 This also explains much of Eng-
land's conduct in the Anglo-German-portuguese matter 
after the proposed agreement became an actuality. It 
possibly explains wby England hesitated and why the 
treaty that was finally made did not go into effect. 
Nevertheless, Balfour, having a specific situation 
before him--an anxious Germany clamoring for an 
agreement which some of the B~itish cabinet had long 
hoped for in one for·m or another--proceeded with 
negotiations in a most direct manner. It would almost 
Beem that he had this one particular task to do. Per-
haps it had been delegated to him by his uncle specifi-
cally. However, it would be hard to furnish a 
satisfactory explanation of such a surmise. Subsequent 
events show some generalized reasons. Evidently the 
Bertie Memorandum and all of its cautions and doubts 
did not deter Balfour. The Memorandum seems to 
1. Memorandum by Mr. Bertie, August 10, 189B, 
~.Q., I, No. 81. 
2. Supra, p. 81. 
summarize the situation up to the point where a 
decision was made to agree with Uermany, but doe. 
not include reference to 8. definite decision to 
sign. 
A1 though Ge rmany di d no t like to change 
horses in mid-stream, ahe felt that there might be 
some advantages. Hatzfeldt presents the situation 
as follows: 
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Al though the delay caused by handing over 
further negotiations to Mr. Balfour is undesirabl., 
yet I think we must consent to it. The last time 
he represented Lord Salisbury, Mr. Balfour waS 
hon.at and forthcoming towards us; when we come 
to discuss the matter with him it will probably 
be soon evident whether a quicker conclUSion i. 
to be expected in this way_ Lord Salisbury says 
that Mr. Balfour will probably start disoussing 
the matter by next Wednesda7.~ 
On August 11 the German Ambassador oalled upon Balfour 
in reference to the Portuguese matter. Balfour ex-
pressed a reluotanoa--similar to his unole's--about 
dismembering Portugal before she was dead.! ne pointed 
out that England was willing to lend money to Portugal 
only to keep her alive. The colonial areas designated 
as collateral were only to be deSignated as a provision 
for the eventuality which the proposed treaty and loan 
1. Count Hatztetdt to the German foreign OffIce, 
August 8,1898, Dugdale, E.T.S., ~. £!i., III, 36. 
2. Mr. Balfour to Sir F. Lascelles, August 11. 
1898, B.D., I, No. 82. --
8'1 
should seek to avoid. However. provisions were 
made on both side s as to the pro bable di spo si tion 
between them of the Portuguese colonies, in oaee of 
such eventualities. Hatzfeldt handed Balfour a 
memorandum as an unofficial communication. It was 
a slight amplification on the one he presented to 
Salisbury on the Third of July. On the eighteenth. 
the German Ambassador had another interview with 
Balfour. Balfour informed Hatzfeldt that aocording 
to his understanding with his uncle, Timor was not 
to be inclUded in the proposed arrangement. l This 
displeased Hatzfeldt who intimated that if Timor 
were not inoluded, the negotiations would be broken 
off, with resulting hard feelings in Germany. 
At this same meeting the acting Prime Minister 
presented the German Ambassador With.two memoranda which 
were England's counter offer to Hatzfeldt's "Unoffioial 
Memrandum" of the eleventh. 2 These Memorand.a summad 
up what had been the previous British stand. The first 
memorandum stated that if money were to be loaned to 
Portugal, it would be loaned Jointly by the two powers, 
England possibly taking the largest loan. These 
1. Bilfour to Sir F. Lasoe11es, August 18, 1898, 
~.~., I, NO. 83. 
2. Ibid., Enolosures 1 and 2. 
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prospective loans were to be secured by revenue 
from Portuguese oolonies so distributed that Germany 
would have the largest and England wha.t was the most 
strategio. This seourity would not entail a. sacrific. 
of sovereignty. These territorial distributions were 
about the same as those which England had demanded up 
to thi s da.te. 
The second Memorandum (B) provided for the 
action GerIIlSllY and England should take if the integrity 
of Portuguese possessions could not be maintained. The 
two powers would take over the areas whioh they had 
allotted to each other merely as loan seourity if 
Portugal could not maintain her integrity. England 
was to get two small trading a.reas in the area of 
Angola deSignated for Germany. Nothing in the Declara-
tion was to detraot from any understanding already in 
effect between Portugal and England. England wanted 
to retain the 'advantages of her alliance with Portugal 
until the very moment Portugal would fall. Timor was 
not mentioned in either Memoranda. The next day the 
Ambassador from Berlin informed Balfour that Timor was 
an absolute "must" for ·the negotiations. l 
By now the negotiations had proceeded to a 
1. Balfour to sir F. Lasce11es, August 19. 189B, 
B.D., It No. 85. --
89 
point where England was making definite commitments. 
The Portuguese government suspected as much. In 
fact, Hatzfeldt's frequent visits to the Foreign 
Offioe were a cause of extreme anxiety to de Soveral. 
He called on Balfour and stated that he feared these 
frequent conferences boded no good to Portugal. l 
Balfour told him that he was sure Portugal knew from 
Salisbury of the deoision of England to aot in unison 
with Germany. Soveral replied to the oontrary. His 
understanding was that Great Britain would first oome 
to an understanding with portugal and then possibly 
invite Germany to ahare the loan and its collateral. 
This was an embarrassing presentation of the 
matter to England because at that partie-alar time 
Portugal had made no ~ fide application for a loan. 
In fact, she had withdrawn her application over a 
month before, on July 13.2 Balfour told the Portu-
, 
gues. representative that eTen though there was no 
ourrent application by Portugal, it would be for the 
best of all ooncerned for En~land and Germany to come 
to an agreement at once. There were t he said, onl,.. 
three possible courses of action for Portugal. 
1. Balfour to Mr. Thornton, August 18, 189S, 
!.12., I, No. 84. 
2. Supr$, Ch. IV, pp. ~4-75. 
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The first was to borrow from Great Britain 
alone, as he had apparently desired; the second 
was to borrow from Grea t Brit ain and Germany 
together. aooording to the proposal whioh I had 
just sketohed out to him; and the third was to 
endeavour to borrow from other Powers, Which 
would probably only be done at the cost of an 
international control, to which we should have 
the strongest objection, and which would be 
disastrous to the independenoe of his oountry. 
If for any reason therefore the first of these 
oourses seemed to us inexpedient, the seoond 
was the one most advantageous to Portugal. I 
told him frankly, therefore, that though I oould 
not say whether our negotiations with Germany 
would be succe8sful, I should endeavour to make 
them so.l 
This was putting the matter bluntly. But at leas·t 
Soveral knew what was going on. Balfour did promise 
to noommunicate wi th him again, if and when, anything 
was 'finally arranged with Germany.n2 
On the twentieth of July Balfour informed 
Hatzfeldt that he and Bertie agreed that Timor could 
be inclUded in the German share of the oollateral.3 
He also suggested that the treaty oould be swallowed 
muoh more easily by Portugal if the interest rate on 
the antioipated loan were kept very low. On the whole 
Hatzfeldt seemed very happy. The agreement was about 
1. Mr. B8ifour to t&. Thornton, August 18, 1898, 
B.E., I, No. 84. 
2. Ibil., No. 64. -
3. Mr. Balfour to Sir F. Las~ellest August 11, 
1898, !.~.t I, No. 82. 
to be concluded. He telegraphed the German Foreign 
Offioe the following message: 
Timor is settled, and I am convinoed that we 
owe it to Mr. Balfour alone, for he urgently 
desires a conclusion. I beg therefore that 88 
few diffioulties as possible be made for him 
regarding his draft, and that a seoret note in 
explanation of the affair be agreed to in the 
manner I recommended. l 
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In conceding Timor, Balfour had to "battle down" 
Chamberlain, who never wanted to see another power 
improve its colonial position more than England 
regardless of the circumstances. 2 When Balfour and 
Hatzfeldt next conferred all seemed smoothly settled.3 
It was agreed that Ger~ would be given some com-
pensation similar to Delagoa Bay if England should 
ever exercise her preemptive rights there. Germany 
deemed this necessary to placate public opinion. 
However, Balfour pointed out that the need for an 
action requiring oompensation for Germany would only 
oocur if Portugal" collapsed completely--beyond the 
extent of help that a loan oould offer. 
Although it was agreed to give Germany 
1. Count Hatzfeldt to the German foreign Offioe, 
August 20, 1898, Dugdale, E.T.S., ~. gli., III, 38. 
2. Dugdale, Blanche, ~. ~., III, 268 ff. 
3. Mr. Balfour to Sir F. Lascelles, August 22, 
1898, ~.D., I, No. 88. 
--------------------------------~-----------------------~---
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preemptive rights over Timor, England declined a 
German suggestion that England be given in return 
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the surrender of German extra-territorial rights in 
Zanzibar. This refusal was based on Balfour's desire 
not to give the impression that England and Germany 
contemplated and desired the eventuality of the pro-
posed agreement, that is, the sharing of the spoils 
of a fallen Portuguese Empire. If England had agreed 
to accept compensation for giving Germany eventual 
preemption of Timor, it would have looked as if the 
two powers "were more bent on dividing Portugal than 
helping her with a loan. Here again the difference 
of the German and English opinion of the treaty oan 
be observed. England wanted to postpone the eventua-
lity; Germany wanted to hasten it. 
A few more minor suggestions were made at this 
conference by both parties. All that remained to be 
done now was to write up the final draft of the treaty. 
This was done, and on August 28, Salisbury gave his 
approval of the arrangement after the drafts had been 
sent to him at Dieppe. He said: 
I am afraid the German negotiations must have 
given you a great deal of trouble. If the Germans 
take to being punctilious they are quite intoler-
able. The result seems to me quite satisfactory.l 
1. Dugdale, Blanche, ~. cit., fIt, 272. 
However, he still indioated his reluotanoe on 
August 30, when he replied to Balfour's message 
informing him that the agreement had been signed. 
He said, "I only hope that it will not come into 
use for a long time.-l 
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When the agreement had been signed the Kaiser 
telegraphed Bulow the follOwing message, shoWing the 
leit motif of the German viewpoint: 
I am very glad of this turn whioh 1s all the 
more important sinoe the peace and disarmament 
proposals and all the ohatter about them add not 
a little to the prospeots of war. I thank you, 
dear Bulow, for your devoted and suooessful 
labours, and for the ability with which you have 
induoed Britain at last to give way to us. This 
is one more great triumph of your diplomatio 
adroitness and farSightedness.! 
The agreement--offioially it was not a treaty 
but. a "note"--wss signed jOintly in London, August 30, 
1898, by Baifour and Hatzfeldt. 3 The agreement 
provided that whenever it was deemed expedient by 
both Germany and Britain to acoede to a request for 
an advanoe of money, the loan was to be made simultan-
eously. The amount to be assumed by eaoh would be 
deoided at the time of lending. The territory was so 
1. DUgd81e, Blanche, ~. ait., III, 272. 
2. Bulow, ~. ~., It 321. 
3. See Appendix A, Band C. 
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divided that Germany would be allowed to take Timor, 
all of Mozambique north of the Zambezi below its con-
fluence with the Shire. and the greater part of 
Angola; England would be allowed to take the remainder 
of Mozambique and Angola. l If a foreclosure of the 
proposed loan were necessary delegates would be sent 
to Portugal to inspeot the revenues. However, no 
rights of administration were to be given to these 
inspectors. Administration of the revenues was to be 
undertaken only if Portugal defaulted. 
To all appearanoes this was a rather logical 
agreement even if Portugal were not allowed a voioe 
in its arrangement. The agreement took cognizance of 
portugal's sovereignty and ostensibly would not have 
gone into effect unless Portugal requested a loan of 
her own volition. England did not hesitate to give 
this part of the agreement wide publicity, a fact 
whioh irritated Germany tremendously.2 Now the Reioh 
oould not object to English aotion in South Afrioa. 
However, what England did not publish was the 
appended seoret agreement which provided for the ex-
clusion of third parties from intervening in Portuguese 
1. See map, Appendix F. 
2. Bulow to Count Hatsfeldt, September 3, 1898, 
Dugdale, E. T. s. t .2l1 • .2!i.. III, 39. 
-------- ~-~-~- ~~~ - ~--- - - - ~ - --
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colonies included in the Anglo-German loan agree-
ment, mutua). abstinence from any future claim to 
those portions of the Portuguese empire allotted to 
each as security, and assumption of complete control 
by Germany and England of those parts of the Portu-
guese empire allotted to each if Portugal ever for 
any reason renounced her sovereign rights. l 
This section could be very dangerous to 
Portugal's integrity. In violation of the "ancient" 
treaties, Portugal was never formally told about the 
Anglo-German negotiation, notwithstanding Balfour's 
promise of Augnat 18, 1898. He merely informed. 
Soveral of the first part of the treaty in whioh 
there was no indication of a provision for the 
possible loss of sovereignty by Portugal. However, 
Lord Edward Grey stated in 1925: ~de Soveral kn.w 
all about the seoret agreement with Germany 'and 
made no seoret to Lord Salisbury of hia knowledge of 
it.'" On September 2, 1898. Salisbury took over 
again. His lack of enthusiasm for the agreement was 
noted immediately in his hesitation and reluctanoe 
to forae a loan on Portugal. 
The Anglo-German agreement of 1898 was signed 
1. Newton, K. P. t A Hundred Years of the - --British Empire, p. 367. 
------------------------- ~~----- - - ---
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on August 31, 1898. On September 1. 1898 Hatzfeldt 
was alread7 at the Foreign Offioe attempting to im-
press on Balfour the possibility of the Portuguese 
acoepting a Frenoh loan. Hatzteldt regarded this as 
extremely probable since Portugal was not apprised of 
the secret olauses in the new oonvention which pre-
oluded participation in a loan to Portugal by any 
power other than England and Germ&n7. He recommended 
immediate activation of the purpose of the treaty. 
Balfour recites the Hatzfeldt presentation of the 
case as follows: 
The German Ambassador called on me this after-
noon in order to speak to me about a possible 
complioation whioh might arise in oonneotion with 
the reoent Anglo-~erman Agreements. He pointed 
out the possibility of the Portuguese Government, 
in ignorance of its exaot terms, going to France 
rather than to the two Powers for the purpose of 
obtaining 8. loan upon the security of the custome 
in her African Colonies. Such a transaction 
might be conoluded before we knew anything about 
it; but inasmuoh as, under the Anglo-German 
Agreements, the two oountries would be bound to 
resist Frenoh intervention, by foroe if neoessary, 
it was manifest that all four Powers might find 
themselves unawares inVOlved in the gravest oom-
plications. 
All this might be aVOided if it was known 
beforehand--at all ~ents by the Portugue se Govern-
ment .. ~tbat we could not admit the intervention in 
the matter of a third Power and that we were pre-
pared to give every facility ourselves to the 
raising of the necessary loan. l 
x. Mr. Balfour to sir F. tascelles, September 1, 
189S, !.~. t It No. 94u 
i--_______________________ ~" ____ "_""~_ -- - ~ - --
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Hatzfeldt urged action by Germany and her 00-
signer, England, before October, the time when he 
surmised tlJat the French loan might materialize. 
Balfour promised to refer the matter to Salisbury 
who was to resume control at the Foreign Offioe. A 
minute added by Salisbury to the above communioation 
gives striking illustration of his personal views as 
well as the future policy and attitude of England in 
oonnection with this treaty. Salisbury wrote: 
I expected this. They are not oontent to 
wait for events to give them their share of 
Portuguese territory, but wish to foroe the paoe 
of destiny. I do not think that it is possible 
to make such an intimation to Portugal till we 
know of the sort of finanoial terms Germany is 
disposed to give. They will be of the Shylook 
school. 
There is no real danger to us--free right of 
preemption protects the East Coast: and our 
ownership of the hinterland proteots LQanda. l 
On September 9, 1898 Salisbury wrote Lasoelles that 
he had instructed the Assistant Under.seoretary to 
tell Hatzfeldt "that, in my opinion, M. de Soveral 
being already aoquainted with the general purport of 
the Anglo-German Agreement, it would be suffioient that 
I 
I should intimate to him that any loan from France 
must not be seoured on the oustoms of Angola, and that 
1. Mr. Baifour to Sir F. Lasoel1es, September 1, 
1898, ~.~., I, No. 94, p. 76! 
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warning I would oonvey to him."l England oontinued 
to give Germany such vague assuranoes. Despite these 
assurances, howeTer, Salisbury wrote the folloWing 
letter to Sir R. MacDonell in Lisbon on November ,: 
The Portuguese Minister oalled at this Offioe 
on the 5th Instant and made, for my information, 
a oommunioation respecting the loan for which the 
portuguese Government are negotiating in Paris. • • 
I have expressed to M. de Soveral generally my 
satisfaotion at the statement made by him on the 
part of the Portuguese Government in regard to the 
loan which they seek to raise in Paris, and I haTe 
stated to him that, under the limitations whioh he 
had mentioned, the finanoial measureS taken by 
Portugal for dealing with her creditors are a 
matter entirely for her own deoision. 2 
This was definitely not the German viewpoint. As early 
as October 1898, without aotive or stout oooperation of 
England, Germany was attempting to force Portugal to 
aooept a loan based on the revenues of her oolonies. 3 
Tattenbaoh, the German Minister, tried again and again 
to get British support in hiB efforts to force Portugal 
to aooept 8 loan.4 The German GOTemmentls oonoept of 
the agreement was all too olearly indioated by their 
1. Saiisbury to sir F. Lasee!1es, september 9, 
1898, B.D., It No. 97. --
2. Salisbury to Sir H. MaoDonell, November 7, 
1898, !.E., It No. 100. 
3. Guedes, 2,£.& oi t., p. 330. 
4. llli. t p. 330. 
attitude then, just a short month after the signing 
of what Eokardstein called a "hypothetical agree-
ment. ltl 
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Sir H. MacDonell, English Minister to Portugal. 
reported on July 22, 1899, the following resume of the 
situation in October 1898. 
I may here observe that, on my return to Lisbon 
in Ootober last, I found Count Tattenbach had been 
preSSing the Portuguese M1nisters--perhaps unduly--
to aooept the good offices of our respective 
Governments for the purpose of raising a loan; he 
then unreservedly admitted to me that he understood 
hie instructions to convey that one of the objeots 
of the Anglo-German Agreement was to induce the 
Portuguese Government to contract a loan in order 
that, when its prooeeds had been extravagantly 
wasted, we should remain wi th a olaim on the con-
trol of the Portuguese Colonial Customs. 
I promptly informed him that I had reoeived no 
such instructions from your Lordship, and that I 
hoped he did not expect 1D8 to follow him in that' 
line of action. 2 
Despite German maohinations to the contrary, 
the agreement never went into effect. Nor did Portugal 
find it necessary to borrow from the English, German 
or French Governments. The Portuguese debts were re-
finanoed from money that was obtained by small tempo-
rary loans based on home revenues at high rates of 
interest, and from the sale of large amounts of produce 
i. Sqpra, eh. tv, p. 77. 
2. Sir H. MacDonell to Marquess of Salisbury, 
July 22, 1899, ~.~., It No. 112. 
p 
arriving from the oolonies. l Private French banks 
raised muoh of this money.2 
So it was then that by July 1899, less than 
100 
a year after the completion of the agreement, Sir H. 
MacDonell could report that Count Tattenbach, German 
Minister in Lisbon, had to admit that a marked im-
provement bad taken place in the finanoial situation 
of Portugal and that the idea of a loan under the 
Anglo-German Agreement was definitely out of the 
question in any oase for the time being.3 The te-
dious dalliance of the British Foreign Office in 
making the agreement and then the studied delay ill 
putting it into effect gives some substantiation to 
Bertie's statement that Salisbury wanted to put Ger-
many off until October, when conditions would be 
better for England. 4 
1. sIr k. MacDonell to Marquess of salisbury, 
July 22, 1899, ~.~., It No. 112. 
2. Garvin, ~. !!i., III. 319. 
3. Sir H. MacDonell to Marquess of Salisbury, 
July 22, 1899, ~.~., It No. 112. 
4. Supra, Ch. IV, p. 83. 
CHAPTER V 
THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE TREATY OJ 1899 OR 
THE SO-OALLED "WINDSOR TREATY" 
!HE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE TREATY 0' 1899 OR 
THE SO-CALLED WWINDSOR TREATY· 
By 1899 the apparently isolated events of the 
"ancient treaties" between England and Portugal, the 
Boer situation, England's isolation, and the dormant 
Anglo-German Portuguese colonial agreement be~an to 
show an interesting relation. This inter-relation 
~ecomes visible upon examination of the Anglo-Portu-
guese Declaration of 1899 erroneously known a8 "Treaty 
of Windsor. n Investigation of the Anglo-Portuguese 
Treaty of 1899 shows how England resolved the dilemma 
of keeping an old friend despite the fact that she had 
made a treaty designed for the eventual disposal of 
the old friend's possessions. Never was the illogical 
metaphor of "having one's cake and eating it, too," 
more literally executed. Out of an apparently im-
possible situation England secured advantages from 
both Germany and Portugal.. To understand how the 
situation of 1899 was resolved, specialized recapitu-
lation of the background in 1898 is necessary. 
Throughout the negotiations for the Anglo-
German agreement of 1898 the pronounced reluctance 
and evident' lack of enthusiasm of England could be 
• 
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notioei. Yet it was politioally and diplomatioally 
neoessary for England to make the agreement with 
Germany. No one knew the character of this neeessity 
IOOre olearly than the German Government., The inSight 
of the German Government into the question is very 
olearly explained by Hatzfeldt's demands to partioi-
pate in the Portuguese loan. These demands had much 
the same oharaoter as an ultimatum. Hatzfeldt's 
report of this conversation with Salisbury on June l~. 
1898, if exaot, shows a most adamant attitude. l He 
said, 
I explained in friendly but emphatic terms 
that one-sided action in the matter here, involv-
ing actual or oontemplate' passing of Portugal's 
sovereign rights in these colonies into British 
hands, would make a very bad impression with us 
and also would not tend to improve our relatione 
whioh we both deSired, and that the question was 
a political one Which he, salisbuq, and not -
'5'himber1ain,"""WOUld have II deold.. - -
Baron Holstein reported a similar version at the inter-
view. 3 The Kaiser substantiates Hatzfeldt's account 
of pressure being brought to bear on England by his 
1. SUpra, ch. III. p. 69. 
2. Hatzfeldt to Foreign Offioe, June 1'. 1898, 
Dugdale, E.T.S., ~. cit., III, 29; also ~.~., XIV, 
No. 267. The undersooring is min •• 
s. BulOW, ~. !!i., II, 828. 
congratulatory message to BUlow. l 
Of course, part of the English Government. 
led by Chamberlain, had made overtures to Germ&n7 
earlier in 1898 for a possible allianoe, only to 
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meet a rebuff. Nevertheless, even the more hesitant 
element of the oabinet led by Salisbury indicated 
that a rapprochement Ddght still be desirable. Con-
sequently, England was on record as wanting some sort 
of an arrangement with Germs.ny. In fact, the impend-
ing Boer holocaust and England's lack of allies made 
such an agreement imperative. Germany was well aware 
of England's predicament, hence her 0001 reception of 
Chamberlain's overtures. She was also well aware of 
her own colonial ambitions, as the reactions to the 
Jameson Raid so well illustrated. The neceSSity of 
Germany's backing down from her initial adamant atti-
tude after the Jameson Raid also showed her Government, 
if not her people, the impossibility of sponsoring the 
Boers against a maritime power. This view had been 
all too well understood by the German Admiral von 
Tirpits. Despite his hatred of England, he condemned 
the official. policy and anti-English trend of German 
{ 1. Bulow, ~. olt., tI, 321. For a fUll quota-
tion of the Kaiser s remarks to Hatzfeldt at this time 
see Supra, Ch. IV, p. 93. 
10. 
public opinion at the time of the J8me80n Raid. 
He believed that both government and publio opinion 
had an lUlrealistio view of Germany's atrengthl --8Il 
argument which would, of course. support his demands 
for a larger fleet. 
Here was a dilemma for Germ~: how could sh. 
secure land in South Africa and yet aToid the danger 
of an impossible war With England? Realizing that 
championing the Boers' oause might be strategioall7 
wrong, in spite of the moral justification of sympa-
thizing with these people, Germany perceived that she 
should bow out as easily aa possible and yet make the 
best bargain that she could for the good of the Reioh 
and faoe-saving before German public opinion. 
This appears to have been in the minds of the 
German politioians throughout the negotiations. It 
is a view expressed early in the negotiations by 
BUlow: 
In leaving the English a free hand regarding Dela-
goa Bay and its Hinterland we take a step whioh 
will oause a feeling of disapPointment amongst 
the whole German people beoause the Boers for 
years haTe beoome the object of a sentimental 
s7Dlpathy whioh 8S in all oases of sympathy oannot 
be oombated on grounds of logio. Therefore, the 
Kaiser's Government, if it is not to suffer 
oapitis diminutio, mnst be in a position to show 
1. Tirpitz, A. Ton, !i Memoirs, pp. 5£ ff. 
that its polioy has not merely made renunoia-
tions but has gained evident advantages.l 
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England, also, realized her own predioament 
only too well; but she was able to turn it into a 
diplomatic viotory. She realized that she had to 
Sign with Germany or else multiply her difficulties 
in South Afrioa and Europe at a time when the Boer 
question, as well as the Fashoda inoident, were 
approaching a climax. Sir Edward Grey expressed the 
situation as follows: 
It seemed clear from what I saw in them 
[papers he subsequently read on the situation] 
that the agreement had been made very reluctantly 
so far as Lord Salisbury was concerned and only 
in deference to German inslstence--pressure would 
hardly be too strong a word. Crudely put, the 
German insistence was this, "YOll [Bri taitU are 
on bad terms with RuSSia and on bad terms with 
1. BUiow to Hatzfeldt, June 22, 1898, G.t., . 
XIV, 274. This also proves that Germany had ?rom the 
very first resolved to get something concrete from 
the agreement. Hence to the German Government it was 
not a8 hypothetical as Eckardstein assumes in his Ten 
Years. (Eckardstein, ~. oit., p. 182.) He, of course, 
was explaining retrospectively according to the letter 
of the agreement and not the spirit of the German 
Government's interpretation of the agreement. Even 
before this statement was made on the 22nd, Bulow 
wrote to Hatzfeldt on the 8th, " ••• dass die Erlaioh-
terung, .. elcha wir dar fetahrlosen A.Ufitiiii Englana:. 
durch unser. woEIioIIin a H8itEit I.w~.n, auch wIe 
iiI •• in der Welt .lnan !reIs~. :i:other-iOras: 
~ermany's-neutrarity' In South>~ica has its prioe 
[Portuguestt Co10nie8) 1ilte everything else in the 
world. (Bulow to Hatzfeldt, June 8,1898, G.P., XIV, 
253 t Pt. I.) - -
France. You C8.ll1'lOt afford to be on bad terms 
with us. l 
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EVidently Chamberlain realized at the time -of the 
aotual negotiations what Grey realized muoh later. 
He said in a letter to Ealfour--during the negotia-
tiona, 
~he only advantage to us is the assuranoe of 
Germany's abstention from further interference 
in Delagoa Eay and the ~ransvaal.--in other words. 
w. pay blaokmail to Germany to induce her not to 
interfere where she has no right of interferenoe. 
Well! it is worth while to p~ blaokmail 80me-
times. 2 
Here Chamberlain gave the clue to England's reasons 
for Signing the treaty with Germany. The polioy was 
not without suooess. ~he desertion of the Eoers by 
the Reich and the deoline of German interest in the 
Fashoda affair after the signing of the agreement of 
1898 is not mere coincidence. 3 
Throughout the negotiations for the Anglo-
German Agreement and afterward, England continued to 
maintain her relationship as usual with Portugal. 
Apparently there was no lessening of the old frien4-
ship. Early in the negotiations (June 12) England 
had assured Portugal, fearing Ger~n preasure on the 
1. Grey, ~. cIt., I, 44. 
2. Garvin. ~. ~.t I, 316. 
3. Schmitt, ~. £!i., p. 144. 
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loan situation, that her attitude would be the 
same as it was in 18'3 when England stated she would 
not be indifferent to foreign interference in Portu-
gal's affairs. l There was one omission in this assu-
rance which was immaterial in 18'3 but all importsnt 
in 1898, namely, reference to integrity of pOBsessions. 
This omission could have been purposeful. It might 
have been deliberately made to oause portugal some 
anxiety which she would be eager to dispel as soon as 
possible. In any case, Portugal did grant England 
certain ooncessions at the time of the AnglO-Portu-
guese Treaty of 1899. 
Whenever Portugal beoame too apprehensive about 
the arrangement pending in 1898 between England and 
Germany, England would offer reassurances as to Eng-
land's good intentions toward her old ally_ However, 
although the reassursnces were enough to show that 
England was still interested in Portugal's friendship, 
they were just vague enough to inspire the proper 
amount of anxiety. Salisbury's and Balfour's promises 
to Soveral to keep Portugal informed on the outcome of 
the negotiations bear witness to this.! It is perhaps 
1. 5a!isbury to sir H. MacDonell, June 22, 1899, 
< B.D., I, No. 68; also Ibid., June 23, 1899, Enclosures 
! and 2. 
2. Supra, Ch. IV, pp. 83 and 90." 
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even possible that Salisbury deliberately let Soveral 
know something about the nature of the secret agree-
ment between England and Germany to keep up this at-
mosphere of anxiety. Soveral must have been told 
something, otherwise he could scarcely have told 
Grey that he knew all about the seoret treaty. 
Soveral's account of the Anglo-Portuguese agreement 
(contained in the French documents) substantiates 
this. 
On New Year's Day, 1899, the King of portugal 
in a speech from the throne announced that the colonial 
possessions of Portugal mnst be maintained 8S a sacred 
heritage of the nation. l England's continued reluct-
ance to force the agreement of 1898 and the obviously 
overt efforts to convey to the world the impression 
that Portugal and England were still the same friends 
as always indioate at least tacit support of Dom 
Carlos' statement. Although most of the evidence 
proving England's desire to stand by her old frient 
is indirect and based on cOinoidenoe, it shows a 
striking correlation to the failure of the Anglo-
German Agreement to be oonsummated and the oonclusion 
of the AnglO-Portuguese Agreement of 1899. This 
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correlation is so striking that it tends to support 
the belief that England never fully intended to 
throw over her old friend. 
SUch an interpretation of the queer events of 
1898-99 could well aocount for England's extreme oon-
cern for the integrity of Portugal at the same time 
that she was making an agreement wi th Germany which 
provided for a possible impairment of that integrity. 
Evidenoe shows that England never wanted to foroe 
the realization of the Anglo-German Agreement. l 
England, to the exasperation of Germany, refused to 
hinder portugal from securing loans whioh did not 
impair the letter of the Anglo-German Agreement by 
mortgaging the colonies in some way.2 
What appears amusing now but was probably 
extremely provoking and puzzling to the Germans at 
the time was the faot that oloser relations were 
aotually observed with Portugal after the oonolusion 
of the Anglo-~erman Agreement than before. 3 The 
Portuguese Ministry openly and deliberately proolaimed 
the olose terms of this friendship and allianoe with 
1. Supra, ei. IV, pp. 96-100. 
2. Fay, ~. ~., p. 134. 
3. Ibid., p. 134. 
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England. l A few months after the conclusion of the 
agreement with Germany, the British roys1 family, in 
the spring of 1899, entertained Dom Carlos, King of 
Portugal.! This was but an extension of the friend-
ship Edward, Prince of Wales, felt for Portugal 
throughout his 1ife. 3 Bulow blames much of the 
failure of the realization of the agreement of 1898 
on the intimate personal friendship between the 
Marquis of Soveral and the Prince of Wales.' 
Superimposed on the whole picture of Anglo-
Portuguese relations from 1898 to 1899 is a pattern 
of confused intrigue and bargaining based on mutual 
fear of what each could do to the other in cooperation 
with another power. The approaching Boer War was the 
basiS of the bargaining. England could use this 
agreement with Germany as a lever to force Portugal 
to cooperate with her in the growing South African 
orisis. On the other hand Portugal could use the 
crisis in South Afrioa and an agreement that she had 
concluded in 1875 with the Transvaal to cauee England 
1. Brandenburg, ~. cit., p. 156. 
2. Fay, ~. ~.t p. 134. 
3. Lee, Sir Sidney, Edward VII, It 70. 
4. Bulow, ~. ~., I, 321. 
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to respect the ominous potentialities of her neutra-
lity and to value her oooperation in the approaching 
war. Aocording to the Transvaal-Portuguese Treaty 
of 1875, Transvaal was able to use the Port of 
Lorenzo Marques as its chief souroe of imports.1 
Since even before the Jameson Raid, the Boers had 
been using the Port of Lorenzo Marques and the rail-
way leading from it to the Transvaal for the trans-
portation of vast quantities of armaments.! Portugal 
was in a position to cause the English to neutralize 
the intentions of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1898. 
In the words of Theodore Wolff, the portuguese were 
now in a position to stop the English from possibly 
"pulling the coat off their back at a convenient 
moment. 3 They could now remind the English with 
good effect of the old alliance treaties which bound 
the English "the proteotion of territorial integrity."' 
On the other hand, England was in a better 
position to bargain than she had been a scant year 
previous--before the Germane pushed themselves into 
1. salisbury to Sir H. MacDonell, September 13, 
1899, ~.~., I, No. 113. 
2. Seton-Watson,~. ~., pp. 277-278. 
3. Wolff, Theodore, The Eve of 1914, p. 263. -.-----
4. Ibid., p. 263. 
the loan negotiations 0 f Portugal. and England. At 
that time England desired concessions at Lorenzo 
Marques. Portugal was not anxious to gi~e them. l 
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In fact, the Portuguese had been very chary of con-
oessions until the intruding Germans appeared. Thi8 
might have been one reason that England decided to 
allow Germany to intrude. Ne~ertheless, England 
knew that Portugal still was able to cause extreme 
embarrassment in South Afrioa, if not kept friendly. 
Just thirteen days after the conolusion of 
the Anglo-portuguese agreement, while Salisbury was 
discouraging German attempts to force a loan on 
Portugal, he reminded Portugal of the long-standing 
agreements between England and Portugal. 2 The pur-
pose of this reminder was to give reason to Portugal 
to stop the shipment of arms to Transvaal. Soveral 
8aid that he could not see how portugal could oonsent 
to do this. However, he did say that portugal would 
not throw ove~ England in oase of a war. In fact, 
she would not even deolare her neutrality in oase of 
an outbreak of hostilities. A deolaration of 
1. Memorandum b,. Ii'. BertIe on England and 
Portugal in Afrioa, May 1, 1898, !.~., I, No. 65. 
2. Salisbury to Sir H. MaoDonell, September 13, 
1899, B.E., It No. 113. 
neutrality would have made tacit cooperation with 
England impossible. England could not use the 
strategic Portuguese colonial porta in Africa. 
On the seventeenth o~ September, MacDonell. 
British representative in Portugal. communicated 
with the Foreign Office on this same matter. l 
Apparently he had been instructed to use pressure 
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on the Portuguese Foreign Mini8ter. who temporized 
and suggested that England ao what Soveral had been 
diligently atriying for, namely. arrive at a oomplete 
understanding on the matter. The Portuguese knew 
when they had a good hand of oards and they intended 
to get as much as possible out of it. 
However, the British felt that they had been 
dealt a good hand. too. The frequent visits of 
Hatzfeldt to the BritiBh Foreign Office led the 
Portuguese to believe that Germany. in oonjunotion 
with England. was about to enforoe the mysteriouS 
olauses of the Agreement of 1898. The British 
played this fear for all it was worth. The British 
line of rea80ning was very similar to the following 
aooount of MaoDonell to the Assistant Under~eeoretary, 
1. sir H. MaoDoneii to Marquess of Saiisbury. 
September 17, 1899, !.~ .. I, No. 114 •. 
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They are convinced that they have nothing to 
~ear from the Boers, so long as they stand b7 
us, and, having fostered an exaggerated idea of 
the value of their cooperation, fancy that the7 
can set their own price on it. 
On the other hand, so long as they au_peot 
that we are aoting with Germany. they will alway_ 
fear that--whatever may be the fortunes of war--
Germany will eventually profit, and may prevent 
us from securing the integrity of their territory_ 
As regarda Lourenco Marques, they are well 
aware that they oannot defend it and that the, 
will inevitably have to appeal to us; but they 
are also well aware that Germany knows this and 
i8 8cheming aocordingly _ _ • 
• __ In short, the situation here i_ a web of 
unoertain't7" intrigue and confa.sion; the Ministers 
being moreover not of a calibre to face it. 
Soveral has until lately kept out of the wa;y 
partl;y from opposition to the present Miniatry 
8.1'1d partly to further hia Oft sohemes of upsetimg 
the Anglo-German Agreement b;y a direct oonvention 
with us. He is moreover firml;y convinced that all 
thil TransTSal question hal been got up b7 Chamber-
lain, at Rhodes' and the Chartered Co., s instiga-
tion; this idea is in some measure shared by the 
Government. 
To sam up, my impression ia that the Portuguese 
Government do not entirely trust us, hence their 
idea of a oonvention whioh would aeoure them from 
all danger not only from the Transvaal but also 
from German;y_ To maintain themselves in their 
Afrioan possessions under present ciroumstanoe8, 
they required men and mone;y. Can we provide them 
wi tbout the knowledge of Germany?l 
l!'ive d81's later Salisbury informed the British 
Ambassador in Lisbon that the possible action of 
1. Sir I. iaoDoneii to Dr. Bertie, September 18, 
1899, B.D., It Bo. 115. --
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portugal in the event of war in South Africa had 
been the subjeot of a oabinet meeting. The Britleh 
Government informed Soveral that in its judpent 
Portugal oould not remain neutral in event of a war.1 
The oabinet was willing to make a defensive al1ianoe 
. 
with Portugal against Transvaal in the event 0 f a 
war between England and Transvaal. Any specific 
questions 0 f military actions resulting from such an 
allianoe would be deoided at the time of necessity. 
Soveral's efforts to reestablish EngliSh oommitments 
for the integrity of Portugal were beginning to bear 
fruit. 
Soveral soon deolared his approval of suoh. an . 
arrangement and even volunteered to make arrangements 
whereby further shipments of arms to the Boers oould 
be stopped.! The only thing that remained to be done 
was to arrive at speoifio wording of the proposed re-
affirmation of the old agreements. Salisbury 
preferred the wording of the "ancient treaties" to 
Soveral's proposal whioh hinged upon the delioate 
meaning of the word, "Bovereignty"--at a time when 
1. s81isbury to sirR. MaoDone11, September 23, 
1899, !.~.t I, Bo. 116. 
2. Salisbury to Sir H. MaoDonell, Ootober 7, 
1899, B.D., It No. 117. Also Enclosures 1 through 5 
(soveral-to Salisbury, October 7, lagg). 
England was having extreme diffiou1ty with that 
word's oontext in reference to Transvaal.1 881i8-
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bury insisted too that a definite olause be in.erte' 
whereby Portugal would promise not to proo1aim 
neutrality in the impending strife.! Sovera1 agreed 
to Salisbury's suggestions on Ootober 7. This waa 
just five days before the Krueger ultimatum of 
Ootober 12, which preoipitated the Boer War. 3 The 
formal agreement was seoret1y signed on October 14. 
1899 (two days after the Boer War broke out) and 
oame to be called the ffWindsor Treaty," through 
error by the Germans, who probably learned of it 
later by roundabout means. The error in the name 
probably results from the German belief that the 
treaty was cono1uded when the King of Portugal 
(Carlos) visited the British Royal Family at Windsor 
in 1899. The real Treaty of Windsor was signed in 
1904 when King Manoe1 signed an arbitration agreement 
during a visit to Windsor. The Germans might have 
had a mistaken understanding of the contents of this 
treaty. Brandenburg's erroneous aooount of the 
1. Soveral to Sall.burr, Ootober 8, 1899, ~.~., 
I, No. 117, Enclosure NOt a. 
2. Ibid •• Eno1osure, No.5. -
3. Ploetz' Manual ~ Universal History. p. 619. 
i _ 
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"Windsor Treaty" is a gOOd example of this misunder-
standing. l 
According to Bulow Germany did not know of 
the exact meaning of this agreement until negotiations 
were re-opened in the years 1912-1914 for the readjust-
ment of the Anglo-German agreement of 189S. 2 He 
states that he learned through a personal friend in 
Paris of the treaty sometime before the remainder of 
the German Government. His excuse for not informing 
the Government seems rather weak. He did not want to 
violate his friend's cOnfidenoe. 3 Bulow gives the 
following account of his understanding of the "Windsor 
Treaty" : 
About the turn of the century I learned, through 
the indiscretion of a foreign diplomat with whom 
I had been on terms of friendship since my youth, 
that Britain, a year after her agreement with 
Germanr, had ooncluded a secret agreement with 
Portugal; this was confirmed by news whioh reachecl 
me from Paris banld.ng ciroles. This agreement, 
the so-oalled Treaty of Windsor, expressedly oon-
firmed existing treaties, in whioh the powerful 
Britain and her client of many years past t the 
little Portugal, guaranteed one another's possess-
ions, undertaking the reciprooal obligation to 
oome in case of need to their defense. The oon-
clusion of the Treaty of Windsor had largely been 
promoted by the then Prince of Wales, of whom the 
Marquis of Soveral, the Portuguese Minister in 
1. DranCIinburg,.u • .ill., pp. 156-'1 and 176. 
2. Bulow, .2E, • .2!i., I, 321. 
3. Ibid., p. 492. -
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London. was a personal Bnd intimate friend. 
This Treaty of Windsor was, of oourse, in flag-
rant conflict with the spirit of the British-
German agreement conoerning the Portuguese 
colonies. It was not only a guarantee for 
Portugal, but actually an enoouragement to 
that country not to mortgage her colonies. It 
increased the old tendency of the Portuguese 
to give preference to Britain in all eoonomio 
questions. To say nothing of the fact that the 
Treaty of Windsor further substantially in-
creased the political dependence of the portu-
guese on Britain.l 
This view is bard to accept because the King of Portu-
gal made public reference to the new Tre.aty in a 
speech in December, 1900 when the BritiSh Channel 
fleet visited Portugal. This fact was pointed out 
by Eckardstein in his l!a Years.! The British Doou-
ments substantiate him to a large extent.! Eckard-
stein's aocount (if true) of bis actions in reference 
to the Anglo-portugue se agreement is very drunaging 
to Berlin Foreign Offioe's olaim of ignoranoe of the 
matter. Eckardstein said that he asked Lord Lansdowne 
in the BritiBh Foreign Office what the Portuguese 
King's statement meant. He was told that it was a 
"reassertion of the AnCient Alliance" and that the 
1. Bulow, ~. cit., I, 321. 
2. Eokardstein, ~. ~., p. 8S. 
S. Editor's summary of facts concerning the 
visit of the British Channel Fleet to Portugal 
December 1900, B.D., I, 97-98. --
Anglo-German agreement of 1898 would be in no w87 
affected by it. Eokar~stein's account says: 
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I telegraphed this at once to Berlin and a180 
sent 8. copy of his letter to the above effect. 
It is consequently incomprehensible to me how 
the Berlin Foreign Office came to believe that 
the expression "r88.ssertion of the allianoe" 
referred to the Anglo-Portuguese boundar,v agree-
ment of 1892 that gave Great Britain a right of 
. preemption OTer Delagoa Bay, and w~ 13 years 
later they were so surprised when the British 
Government again brought up the Windsor Treat" 
in the negotiations between Sir Edward Grey and 
Prince Liohnowsky. For they had before them 
the text of Lord Lansdowne's letter in which 
the reaffirmation of the ancient alliance i. 
expressly mentioned, and both the English and 
portuguese papers explained that the King' 8 
speech at Lisbon had referred to the reoent 
ren val 0 f the 17th century allianoe. ~ 
On the basis of this evidence tit is hart to 
explain the German indignation after 1900 at being 
completely uninformed. unless Eokardstein misrepre-
sented some facts, as Bulow intimates in his Memoirs,2 
or unless the German Government deliberately assumed 
an air of ignorance about the treaty of 1899 in order 
to increase the feeling of animosity in Germany 
against England. This is particularly true after 
the German navy program began to get under way and 
after the Boer war broke out. 
1. EokirdStein, .2R.. cit., p. 183. 
2. Bulow, .2£. ill.. t p. 386. 
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Bulow has pointed out the intensity of German 
feeling on the matter: 
• • • we should remind ourselves of the perfidious 
duplicity with which, by means of the insidioua 
"Windsor Treaty," Britain had gone behind our 
backs to render ineffectual the treaty over the 
Portuguese colonies just ooncluded with ua? Should 
not this suggest distrust, must it not inspire 
great caution? The harshness and ruthlessne.s 
wi th whioh Britain was handling all the incidents 
of the Boer War with regard to ourselves, the 
close-fisted pettiness which she displayed towards 
U8 and again particularly towards us in all colon-
ial negotiations, were these encouragements to 
cooperate Britain ••• yl 
Brandenburg gives a more legalistic reaction, 
which is impartial. to say the least. Hia account i. 
giTen below: 
• • • as regards the Windsor Treaty of 1899 with 
Portugal, erroneous title used here it would haTe 
been more loyal and prudent not to haTe concluded 
it, if England was in earneat about an allianoe. 
But it occurred, as we saw, after the failure of 
the. first overture, at a moment of sharp and almost 
hostUe tenSion, and it did not run direotly 
counter to her engagements with Germanr. though 
it lent to them a 'Very narrow and unexpected !nter-
pretation.! 
On technioal grounds Germany had good reaSon 
to complain because the spirit of the Anglo-portuguese 
agreement completely negated the spirit of the Anglo-
German agreement. HoweTer, the English statesmen 
1. Mow t .!!R.. cit •• p. 385. 
.. 
2. Brandenburg, .!!R.. ~., p. 176. 
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would haye been much more unscrupulous had the7 
honored the German agreement and sold their staunch-
est friend down the river. 
One loses sympathy for the German cries of 
perfidy when it is noted that the Reich, without 
consulting England, as the spirit of the dormant 
agreement of 1898 required, was attempting to aecure 
portions of Angola as well as coaling stations in the 
Azores, for an anti-British Navy. Germany began to 
attempt to gain these concessions from Portugal 
before the existenoe of the "Windsor Treaty" was even 
suspected. All ahe knew at the t~e was that the 1898 
agreement with England had not been immediately 
successful because of a lack of English enthusiasm 
in pushing over a weak old friend. Nevertheless, the 
treaty of 189S was still a ~ ~ agreement b7 
which Germa~ bound herself to act in conjunction 
with England in disposing of Portuguese oolonies any 
time after 1898. No time limit had been specified 
when the treaty was signed. Hence Germany was just 
a8 perfidious in spirit as England, if not more so.l 
The treaty that was signed in 1899 was in 
reality merely an exohange of notes reaffirming the 
1. B.D •• 'lIlt 49 ff. cites the documents 
substantiating this point. 
old treaties. l It had this added statement, how-
ever, "The government of His Most Fsi thful Majesty 
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Portugal will not proclaim neutrality in the war 
between Great Britain and South Africa. we Britain 
had gotten the concession she wanted so badly from 
Portugal just two days after the Boer War broke out. 
By having a benevolent non-belligerent Portuguese 
oolonial empire at her back in Afrioa, the outoome 
of the Boer War was much more oertain for England. 
There oan be no doubt that the so-oalled 
"Treaty of Windsor" accomplished what Soveral wanted, 
namely t the emasculation of the Anglo~Germa.n agreement 
of 1898. Portugal had played a shrewd and suooessful 
game of diplomacy, but England was twioe winner; she 
secured German abstinence from opposition to the 
English South Afr~oan policy by one treaty against 
an old ally and used that same treaty to bludgeon 
support from Portugal in the South African situation--
support that portugal would have otherwise hesitated 
to give for fear of antagonizing the dangerous BUB-
ceptibilities of Germany and her darling, the 
i. see Appendix D for complete text of the 
1899 Agreement. 
2. Anglo-portuguese Seoret Deolaration, 
Ootober 14, 1899, !.]., I, No. 118. 
Transvaal. Truly, "The German diplomats had been 
decisively outmaneuvered. u1 
1. Carroll, ~. ~., p. 408. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EPILOGUE - 1912-1914 
OHAPTER VI 
EPILOGUE - 1912-1914 
• • • both England and Germany have one 
feeling in oommon, and that is fear of 
another. Neither wants to be the first 
to propose negotiations but both are 
agreed that they should be brought about 
though neither desires to make the neces-
sary concessions. 
--001. House to President Wilsonl 
Following the chimerical results of the Anglo-
German agreement of 1898 and the growing rivalry of 
the two North-Sea powers, their relations grew more 
and more strained. Despite several attempts to 
establish a closer bond between the two powers, an 
atmosphere of extreme hostility developed. This 
development was given particular impetus after 
Viotoria's reign ~nded, when the Edwardian Era saw 
the establishment of the Entente Oordiale between 
France and England. 
The agreement of 1898 remained a more or less 
dormant issue betwe~n the two signers for over a 
decade. During this time relations between Portugal 
and England were cordial. During the first five days 
1. Seymour, Charles, Intimate Papers of 
Colonel Hous., I, 258. 
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in April 1902, Edward VII visited Portugal. In 8 
speeoh before the assembled Chambers of Commeroe he 
gave heartfelt assurances of the British intentions 
to preserve the integrity of her loyal ally of Old. l 
On November 16, 1904 King Manoel of Portugal visited 
Windsor and signed a treaty of arbitration with 
England. This was the real "Treaty of Windsor" 8 
name whioh many German authorities have erroneously 
given to the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement of 1899. 2 
Until about 1911 Portugal and England were 
working to thwart German efforts to secure a harbour 
in one of the Portuguese 0010ni8s. 3 For the nonoe, 
at least, the erstwhile collaborators for an eventual 
division of portuguese colonies were working at oross 
purposes. Reasons for this differenoe are explained 
in the growing distrust resulting from the advanced 
evolution of the alliance system and the naval 
rivalry. Nevertheless, there were powers at work in 
England and in the oivil government in Germany whioh 
would have liked to have olosed this ever widening 
breaoh. 
1. Benson, E. F., The Kaiset: !:!!! His English 
Relation., p. 182. 
2. B.D., VIII, 49, Editor's Note. --
3. B.~., VIII, 49 ff. 
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Henoe it was that the fruitless 1898 agree-
ment was remembered. As early as June 23, 1911, 
Germany began to inquire as to the possibility of 
division of the Portuguese colonies through the 
intermediary of Baron Stumm, who spoke to Sir F. 
Bertie in Paris. l The inquiry was unofficial, sinoe 
stumm was not conneoted with the Government at this 
time. Metternich, the German Ambassador to London, 
hinted to Grey somewhat later that Germany would 
like a division of colonies to take plaoe as soon as 
possible.! B.r 1912 Germany had specifically 
suggested that negotiations on the Portuguese question 
be revived. 5 The urgent need for amending relations 
was obvious. 
Circumstances seemed more opportune than they 
had for some time. The ancient Portuguese Monarchy 
had been overthrown on October 5. 1910 b7 the republi-
oans. These republioans, with a somewhat narrow out-
look wished to find some scapegoat on Which to blame 
Portugal's trouble. They attributed exclusively and 
1. Sir F. BertIe to Sir Edward Grey, Paris, 
December 21, 1911, ~.~., X, Pt. II, No. 265. 
2. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, December 
29, 1911, B.D., X, Pt. II, No. 266. . --
3. Steed, H. W., Through Thirty Years !,ill-,!!!!. 
p. 587. 
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conveniently the evils of the Monarchy, brought on 
largely by carelessness and indifference and their 
own legislative bickering, to the House of Braganza, 
the Jesuits and the British Al1ianoe. l The German 
Minister at Lisbon in 1913, in summarizing the course 
of the revived negotiations up to January 20, 1913, 
described the situation as follows: 
In Germany the logical effeci for some years 
after 1899 was necessarily that the Portuguese 
busineSS was considered to have been a failure and 
to be over and done with. Not until the efforts 
of Imperial policy produced a desire for normal 
relations on both sides of the North Sea was the 
Portuguese colonial problem again brought to the 
fore, less perhaps at first because of the intrin-
sio value of the Portuguese oolonies than in order 
to find an advantageous basis for negotiations 
between two oountries. • • The fall of the 
Monarchy in Portugal made it considerably easier 
for the British Government and public opinion to 
further draw away from their ally, the Republic, 
with its apparently chronically anarchical condi-
tions, and after securing for England the most 
valuable portions, to be content to make not in-
conSiderable ~acrifices in Germany's favour ••• 
As then 1898 England and Germany are agreeing 
on a policy of partition, and Portugal again 
equally appears to h~ve reached the end of 
financial resources.! 
Rosen's summary covers the resumption of the 
Portuguese question very comprehensively and rather 
aocurately; however, several pOints are omitted which 
1. Bell, Aubrey F. G., "Chaos in Portugal,w 
from These Eventual Years, p. 176. 
2. F. Rosen, Minister at Lisbon to Chancellor 
Betbmann Hollweg, January 20, 1913, Dugdale, E.T.S. 
2R. Cit., IV, 221-222. 
, 
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give the English standpoint a somewhat different 
sspeot. 
1!8 
It is hard to explain the British reasons 
for permitting the long moribund question to be ex-
humed; however, it is a well-established faot that 
Sir Edward Grey was extremely anxious to offer the 
olive branoh to Germany in order to end the long 
period of dissension. l But what the German Govern-.. 
ment failed to understand was that while Sir Edward 
Grey felt bound to honor engagements into whioh 
Balfour and Chamberlain had unwisely entered, he 
was equally determined not to be disloyal toward 
Portugal.! 
With Grey trying to satisfy these two inoom-
patible goals, the negotiations were doomed to have 
s. stormy oourse beoause the Germans regarded as in-
sincerity what Steed oalls "two conourrent though 
eventually incompatible honesties."3 Grey explains 
his dilemma in this manner: 
1. Robirtson, Malcolm, Introduction to Vol. tv, 
German Diilomat1c Dooument., January !o, 19!!',--
DUgd81e, .T.S.,~. ~., IV, xiv. 
2. Steed, ~. ~., p. 338. 
3. ~., p. 338. 
As to the future it is olear from what Metter-
nioh has already said to me that the Germans 
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would like the division of the Portuguese Colonies 
to take plaoe as soon as possible. So Bhould I. 
These Colonies are worse than dereliot BO long as 
Portugal has them • • • the Union of South Afrioa 
will never rest till it has Delagoa Bay: on every 
groWld material and moral and even Portuguese it 
would be better that Portugal should sell her 
Colonies. But how oan we of all people put pres-
sure on Portugal to sell: we who are bound by an 
Allianoe to proteot and preserve her Colonies for 
Portugal--an Allianoe renewed seoretly for value 
reoeived during the Boer war? And Portugal won't 
part with her Coloniea--any regime in Portugal 
that did so would be overturned by a revolution--
for when nations have gone down hill till they are 
at their last gasp their pride remains undimin-
ished, if indeed it is not inoreased. It olings 
to them as Taoitus says the love of dissimulation 
olung to Tiberius at his last gasp.l 
Trevelyan, Grey's apologist, states that he attempted 
to olarifY rather than to oomplioate the tangle. 2 At 
any rate England did not do as Tirpitz blatantly 
accused--deliberately offer Germany territory that was 
not English in order to plaoate Germany.3 Lord 
Haldane, speoial'representative to Berlin in 1912, 
explained the situation as merely being an undertaking 
to agree about possible zoneswhioh each nation might 
purohase or exploit should they be placed on the 
1. Sir Edward Grey to sir E. Goschen, December 
29, 1911, ~.~., X, Pt. II, No. 266. 
2. Trevelyan, G. M., Grey of Fallodon, pp.269 ff. 




market. l This explanation, of course, wall only the 
literal interpretation. Potentially the treaty was 
much more dangerous for Portugal. However, Germany 
was the initiator of the new negotiations, not 
England. 
While the conversations for a renewal of the 
1898 agreement began as early a8 1911 under the guid-
ance of the German Ambassador Metternich, it was not 
until 1912 that the negotiations began to take a 
more definite shape under the guidance of Prince 
Lichnowsky, the new German Ambassador, who took over 
in November 1912. He began energetioally, almost at 
the moment of his arrival, to attempt to acoomplish 
something definite on the Portuguese question. Within 
three days after he presented his oredentials to 
London he was able to induoe Grey to draw up a draft 
agreement revist'ng that of 189S.2 
Lichnowsky was very well liked in London and 
apparently enjoyed the confidence and cooperation of 
the government there to a remarkable degree. Through-
out his aocount of the drawn out (two years) dealings 
on the question he showed a generous appreciation of 
1. H81dane, visoount, Richard Burdon, Before 
the War. p. 145. --
2. Nicholson, ~. !!!., p. 285. 
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England's viewpoint. Liohnowsky was interested i. 
the oonoomitant possibilities of the treaty a8 much 
as, if not more than, the possibility of immediate 
material gain it offered Germany. The ne" German 
Ambassador oompletely understood Grey's insistenoe 
on publishing both the Anglo-German agreement on 
Portuguese colonies as it would be revised and the 
Anglo-Portuguese Deolaration of 1899. Grey had 
arrived at suoh a decision long before Lichnowsk7 
took over the negotiations--in January 1912 to be 
exact. l At this time Grey was personally opposed to 
secret treaties whioh he regarded as embarrassing and 
inoonvenient.! Despite the rather oallous negotia-
tions that occurred under Grey's supervision as to 
what country might get what section of portugal's 
domain, it seems that Grey did not want to'regard 
the possibility of a restatement of the 1898 agree-
ment purely aa a means of enlarging the domain of the 
Empire. It would seem rather that Lord Haldane was 
right. Grey merely wanted to use the renewed negotia-
tions as a means of destroying the rancor ·in Germa~ 
1. Grey's Minute to Sir Eyre orowe's Memorandum 
on Timor and the Anglo-German Secret Conventions of 
1898, January 26, 1912. ~.~ •• X. Pt. II. No. 270. 
2. Grey to Sir Franois Bertie, ~.~ •• X, Pt. II, 
No. 364. 
and the uncertainty in Portugal resulting from the 
diplomacy of 1898-1899. Guedes states that Gre7 
J 
promised the Portuguese President Teixeira Gomea 
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categorioally that he would not sign the modification 
without the expressed condition that it would be 
immediately published as would also be the embarrass-
ing secret treaties of 1898 and 1899.1 Grey's probable 
reasons for publishing all of these agreementa simul-
taneously was to show to the world that England was 
not as perfidious as the mystery about the 1898-99 
situation made England appear. He. of course. had to 
publish the treaties if he wanted to show their hypo-
thetioal nature and if he wanted to allay the suspiciona 
of Franoe that England was about to debilitate the 
strength 0 f the Entente Cordia:!.e. 2 Here again Gre7 
was striving to overoome another dilemma--establish 
better relations with Germany while keeping Germany" 
enemw, France. friendly to England. 
Lichnowsky's appreciation of these delicate 
intrioacies is best shown by a note with whioh he 
prefaced his discussion of the Anglo-German Colonial 
Convention in his A!! !!! Wege !!! Absrund--Heading 
1. Guedes. ~. cit., p. 336. 
2. ~.~., X, Pt. II, 559 ff. 
L ______ ~ 
lSS 
ill !a! Abyss: 
From the outset the British Government, for 
reasons of home and foreign policy, laid it down 
as saine %Ub non for the conclusion of a new treaty tha o~the new treaty and all the old 
ones should be published. Sir E. Grey also oon-
sidered it of great importanoe that 'thiS treaty 
should demonstrate the unanimity between the two 
Governments and show the world that it was 
possible to reaoh agreement in such fields.' 
Despite this plain statement it was not till 
shortly before the outbreak of the war that the 
German Foreign Offioe could be induoed to permit 
the publioation and ratifioation of the new 
treaty, long after it was oomplete! One pretext 
after another was sought in order to find some 
way of rendering the trea~, abortive. --The whole 
attitude of the British Minister, at any rate, 
showed his Sincere desire for a rapproohement 
with us. l 
Even though the conditions requisite to a 
signing of an agreement seemed unsurmountable, the 
German Ambassador"was able to get a revised agreement 
down on paper. All that remained was to iron out 
speoial ohanges that eaoh side wanted to insert into 
the old arrangement. To aocomplish this, tediOUS 
diokering oontinued from December 1912 to Ootober 20, 
1913, when a final draft was initialled (not officially 
signed) by Grey and LichnoWSky.2 Most of the agreement 
was very similar to that of 1898. Several significant 
1. Prinee Lichnowsky, Reading for the AbysS, 
p. 270. 
2. B.D., X, Pt. lIt pp. 428-540. Also G.P. 
XXXVII, 13-86. See Appendix E for text and Appendix G 
for illustration of territorial disposition. 
~-------------------~- - -_._-~~--. 
alterations were made, however. These alterations 
were explained by the German Minister at Lisbon's 
oomments on the agreement to his Chanoellor. Re 
said: 
134. 
In the nature of the case comparison of the 
two Conventions follows on two lines, partition 
of spheres of interest and the posSibility of 
making the Convention effective. The loss of the 
Portuguese half of the island of Timor--the gain-
ing of whioh by us was always more than problema-
tioal--and of the strip on the left bank of the 
Zembezi is, in my op1nion, more than paid for b1 
our aoquiring the oentral part of Angola and by 
the British desinteressement regarding st. Thomas 
and Prinoipe, whIoh two islands form the most 
valuable part of all portugal's oolonial Empire. 
What we give up in Afrioa--the Zambezi territory 
whioh is entirely controlled oommeroially by 
Englishmen, and a oomparatively small portion of 
eastern Angola, is hardly worth oonsideration as 
against the faot that now our sphere of influenoe 
in Angola'wUl. with German Southwest Afrioa, 
form a compact oolonial territory with a ooast 
covering 20 degrees Longitude, whose good harbours 
and fertile highlands, suitable for settlement, 
promise highly prosperous future developments. 
As regards part it i on 0 f the country the advan--
tages of the new Convention seem to me even 
greater, when I oonsider its possibilities. The 
Convention of 1898 was founded on the assumption 
that portugal was faced with an inevitable 
financial collapse and would be glad to pledge 
her colonial customs for a loan granted by Germany 
and England. This assumption proved false. Sinoe 
then Portugal has raised no loans of any size. 
Financially she has--although with difficulty--
kept her head above water, and lately she appears 
to have wiped off her defioit and balanoed her 
Budget. Your Excellency has realised this in good 
time and has thought well to introduce into the 
new Convention oertain olauses taking aocount of 
our aspiration without reference to Portugal's 
need of a loan, so that we need not fear again 
p 
that what we have won by treaty will be lost 
to us in practice.l 
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What Rosen significantly adumbrated in the 
closing lines of his dispatch was the most radical 
departure in the new agreement from that of 1898. 
T.he eighth clause in the Draft convention of 1913 
made provision for jOint interference by the German 
Reich and British Empire in the Portuguese Empire 
in event of any disturbanoe or irregularity in the 
Portuguese colonies which would endanger the lives, 
property, or vital interests of German and British 
citizens. If the treaty were aotivated with such 8 
clause, the realization of its material aims would 
be accomplished much more easily by the designing 
powers. 
Grey probably realized the terrifio import 
of this clause. Hence his inSistence on the publioa-
tion of the treaties so as to leave no element of 
doubt anywhere. ETeryone ooncerned. including Por-
tugal, would realize the enormous potentialities of 
the treaty and would oonsequently do everything to 
avoid creating an exouse for its consummation. This 
1. F. Rosen, at Lisbon, to the Chanoellor, 
Bethmann-Hollweg. November 9th. 1913. Dugdale, E.T.S., 
££. £!ie, IV, 228-229. 
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would aot 8S a brake on the Portuguese inefficiency 
and possibly lead to reformation of the very unstable 
political situation in portugal that the Germane were 
banking on for the realization of their aspirations 
in the draft agreement. This was specifioally ex-
pressed by Rosen in his report of January 9, 1913. 
Rosen, Solf (German Colonial Seoretary), and 
Lichnowsky were not opposed to immediate publication. 
However, the German gOTernment hesitated in spite of 
the fact that Grey stated that he would not offioially 
sign the new agreement unless it were made publio. 
Liohnowsky said that his government refused 
to acoede to Grey's requirement beoause there were 
people in the government who were personally jealous 
of his successful beginnings on a new Anglo-German 
understanding. 1 Although this might have some bear-
ing on the oase it is likely that the German govern-
ment had a more fundamental reason than this. 
Probably Germany did not want to make portugal wary 
and then, too, if the treaties were openly proolaimed, 
Frenoh suspioions of England would be allayed. France 
would see that England had not concluded a revolution-
ary agreement with Germany but merely ~ clarification 
1. Lichnowsky, ~. cit., p. 61. 
of an agreement that originated before the establish-
ment of the Entente Cordiale. German apologists suoh 
as Count Montgelas maintain that the Germans were 
more sincere about the ultimate possibilities of a 
broad understanding that this revival possessed than 
was England. l However, the main ourrent of German 
polioy at this time disproTes Montgelas' contention. 
Germany might haTe reopened the treaty in the weak 
hope of using it as a means of purchasing British 
nentrality.2 Grey's insistence on publication of the 
documents would destroy this value of the negotiations 
beoause the exhibition of the oontents of the treaties 
would show that England had no desire to arrive at an 
understanding with Germany at the expense of the 
English allies. France would know that she was not 
being deserted. Publioation would show that the 
foundation of the Anglo-German arrangement was laid 
years before the Entente Cordiale was consummated. 
Suoh an interpretation of the actions of Berlin in 
these negotiations gains credence when it is observed 
that Bethmann-Hollweg suddenly agreed to publication 
1. Montgeias, Max, British Foreign Policy 
under Grey, p. 52. 
2. Dugdale, E.T.S., ~. ~., IV, 217 
(Editor's Note). 
l~ 
of the documents in question on July 2, 1914.1 
Germany was willing to accede to the British oondi-
tions of publication only at the last moment before 
the war broke out. They did this in the vain hope 
that suoh a concession to British desires might 
purchase British neutrality in the forthooming con-
fliot. The Archduke Fr~~z Ferdinand and his wife had 
been assassinated June 28. 
The epilogue to 1898 merely substantiates what 
the tangle of 1898-99 began to vaguely indioate. The 
duel for Empire might allow for understanding on small 
points, but fundamental differences were too large to 
make possible a unity of aotion. Nicholson correotly 
sums up the situation by saying nAnglo-German friend-
ship remained t however, superficial. Beneath the 
sugar-ooating of these amenities the old fear and 
rivalry had lost none of its bitterness. n2 
1. Lichnowsky to the Chancellor, July 14, 1914, 
~gdale, E.T.S., ~. ~., IV, 233. 
2. Nicholson, ~. ~., p. 286. 
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CONCLUSIONS--WHO PAID THE PIPER 
If judged in the cold light of objeotivity 
and theory, Lord Carnook (Arthur Nioholson) waB 
oorrect when he called the convention regarding the 
Portuguese colonies the most oynical bUSiness that 
he had ever run aoross in his whole experience of 
diplomaoy. A friend, whose loyalty had been proven 
for over five hundred years, was the unwilling subject 
of negotiations between the world powers whose rivalr7 
was very outspoken. Portugal was given no voice in 
the negotiations which took advantage of her internal 
weakness to use her as a means of placating, tempor-
arily, two ravenous powers bent upon ultimately 
destroying one or the other. The apparently useless 
friend was to be the soapegoat. This interpretation 
is the most evident one and superficially at least--
if only the theoretioal aspeots are coneidered--ie 
quite plausible and true. However, the fact still 
remains that the Portuguese Empire is intact to this 
day with the possible exception of Timor which is 
jeopardized by a power not directly involved in the 
1898-1914 negotiations. During World War I portugal 
and England remained allies as of old and fought side 
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by side against Germany, with whom the letter of 
the Anglo-German colonial treaties had provided for 
a possible partition of the Portuguese colonies. 
The old Portuguese alliance was stronger than the 
possibilities contained in the Anglo-German oolonial 
deolarations. 
Evidently, then, in ~pite of the theoretioal 
provisions of the Anglo-German colonial agreements, 
Portugal had not been deserted by her time-proven 
ally. There are several possible explanations that 
made the ominous situation turn out so favorably for 
Portugal. A first and obvious explanation might be 
that England neTer intended to desert her old friend 
and remained true to her alliance commitments of old. 
A seoond explanation might be that Portugal's friend-
ship still had a material value to England despite 
the chaotic condition of portugal's government. A 
third explanation might be found in coinoidental 
events, which by chanoe made possible the continuanoe 
of the old relationship. 
Salisbury's unvarying reluctance to conclude 
the agreement with Germany end his shifting the respon-
sibility of it to his nephew might be ~sed as proof of 
the first explanation. Salisbury never relished the 
-------~-
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idea of the treaty. His promises to keep Soveral 
informed and his probable informing Soveral of the 
contents of the treaty of 1898 would tend to sub-
stantiate a belief that the English Cabinet, or at 
least a most influential part of it, never really 
intended to sell Portugal "down the river. ltl 
Possibly Salisbury let the Chamberlain element of 
his Cabinet play with the idea of an alliance with 
Germany based on a colonial agreement. By dOing this 
he could fUse the odd elements in his government. 
There were several factions in the Cabinet. Indirect 
evidence to support this is abundant. Salisbury was 
at odds with his own nephew. Sir Francis Bertie's 
retrospective interpretation of Salisbury's declining 
influence in his own Cabinet substantiates this. 2 
Guedea declares that there were differenoes on the 
oolonial questions between Salisbury and Chamberlain.3 
This difference between the Colonial Secretary and 
the Prime Minister approached a rivalry.' Salisbury 
1. Supra, Ch. IV, pp. a1 ff. Also Supra, Ch. V, 
pp. 106-107. 
2. Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, January 12, 
1912, ~.~.t X, Pt. II, No. 268. Also Supra, Ch. iV, p.a3. 
3. Guedes, .2.ll • .ill. t p. 330. 
4. Hoyningen, Heinrioh Freiherrn von, Undersuch-
~S!n zur Geschichte des deutsch-englischen Bundnisprob-
~, IS98-1901, p. ln97 
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might have used this situation in his Cabinet to 
bait Germany into believing that there was a possi-
bility of foroing England to reach a colonial agree-
ment by playing one element of the Cabinet against 
the other. All the time he may never have intended 
to use the treaty unless compelled to, because of 
respect of the foroe of publio opinion, Which never 
would have fully oondoned the desertion of portugal.1 
The fact that the portuguese Government, never 
extremely anxious about the negotiations, remained 
on the best of terms with England throughout is 
possibly an indication of some kind of assuranoe 
that England would never desert her. This faot i. 
either an indication of assurance or an indioation 
that the secret elements of the treaty were real1~ 
seoret. However, the negating effect of the subse-
quent English and Portuguese Treaty of 1899 seems to 
disprove the latter conoept. That is, the portuguese 
mnst have known of the secret agreement between 
England and Germany, otherwise they would not have 
entered into the agreement of 1899 with England. 
Soveral's profession of complete knowledge of the 
negotiations of 1898 al.so refutes this view. 
1. Liohnowsky, ~. ~., p. 312 •. 
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The second explanation of the ineffective-
ness of the German-English Colonial Agreement has 
even more sUbstantiation. Portugal's friendship 
still had a definite value in 1898. At this time 
Germany thought she had England in an embarrassing 
position and sought to gain what she could in return 
for German neutrality in the Boer situation. Con-
sequently, England was foroed, more or less, to sign 
the agreement. However, instead of getting what she 
had expeoted beoause of this treaty, Germany was 
aotually thwarted. Now Germany oould not aot unless 
she aoted in oonjunotion with her oo-signer, England. 
If England refused to aot, Germany had to wait. The 
German government oould not oomplain to the world 
about the unfairness of suoh purposeful dallianoe 
because it would immediately reveal its own seoret 
involvement in a despicable agreement which the world 
oould decry and whioh other powers probably would 
demand to be settled by an international conferenoe 
of some sort. Such a conference would, of oourse. 
destroy any advantages England and Germany would 
jointly enjoy as a result of the secret agreement. 
However, it would not destroy righls o~ pre-emption 
to oertain portions of the portuguese Colonial Empire 
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which England had held by previous bona fide agree---
mente between the British Empire and Portugal. 
GermanJ unwittingly forced herself by poor judgment 
in treaty making--while forcing England-~to depend 
on the doubtful possibility of England's agreeing to 
overthrow Portugal. This was a possibility which 
England never could afford to make actual as long as 
there was a Boer danger. Portuguese benevolenoe in 
the forthooming war was too valuable. The Declaration 
of 1899 between Portugal and England amply proves this 
pOint. The suspeoted assurances Salisbury gave 
Soveral would also tend to prove this as would Portu-
gal's oontinued friendShip and relative calm amid 
the overtly despicable negotiations of England with 
Germany. 
The third explanation of the failure of reali-
zation of the declared results of the oolonial negotia-
tions depends on oiroumstanoe. If the Boer danger had 
not been present in 1898 and if the World War had not 
oome at the very moment a seoond agreement was about 
to be signed in 1914, and if more adroit diplomats 
had framed the German course of action, Portugal might 
have been sacrificed as the coloni~l agreements of 
1898-1914 seem to indicate. 
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Perhaps a simpler interpretation than any 
of the three given would be a statement saying that 
events show that the Anglo-German colonial agreements 
never realized their avowed purpose beoause they were 
at cross purposes with the oourse of the greater 
current of the history of the time--duel for empire. 
Specific oonolusions concerning the negotia-
tions can be made however. They are as follows: 
1. Portugal unconsciously set up the situation 
for the Anglo-German colonial agreements by asking 
for a loan based on colonial revenues at a time when 
her financial oredit was of doubtful value. 
2. Germany in each instance instigated the 
negotiations between the Reich and England fpr dis-
posal of Portugat's colonies. England entered the 
agreements only after German pressure pointed the way. 
3. portugal gave no approval to the Anglo-
German agreements which ignored her sovereign right 
to have a voice in the disposal of her own property. 
4. portugal did not lose her Empire even 
though England and Germany had an agreement providing 
for an eventual division. 
5. Germany was definitely out-maneuvered. 
6. Portugal received more material benefit 
I 
! . 
from her seoret treaty than did Germany. The Por-
tuguese oolonies were more valuable to England 
during the Boer War as Portuguese colonies than 88 
German possessions. 
7. The Boers lost their best hope for aid 
because of the Anglo-German and Anglo-portuguese 
agreements. 
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8. Chamberlain was partially to blame that 
his desired alliance with Germany was never realized 
because it was at cross purposes with his colonial 
ambitions. 
9. There was not oomplete unanimity in the 
British government on the desirability of oonoluding 
the Anglo-German-Portuguese deal. 
10. Secret treaties become increasingly more 
embarrassing in proportion to the time they have peen 
kept seoret. 
11. England and Germany arrived at an agreement 
on the portuguese question because of the desires of 
some members of the Governments of the two Empires. 
However, the general policy and destiny of the nation, 
and their government never sincerely or enthusiasti-
cally pursued such a desire. Specific agreements on 
isolated pOints of differenoe between rival powers 
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are valueless unless a broad sinoere general under-
standing has been reaohed and supported by the entire 
government of both oontending powers. 
12. Both England and Germany were using the 
colonial agreement for ulterior reasons. England's 
ulterior reasons for signing the agreements with 
Germany have been fully explained. Germany had other 
reasons besides oolonia1 gain whioh oaused her to 
sign. Bulow (in retrospective disoussion) says that 
the treaty was merely a trial balloon to determine 
if England was still perfidious Albion: "In this 
treaty of 1898 I was oonoerned not only for the 
aotua1 subjeot of negotiations, the Portuguese 
possessions in Afrioa, but also for the opportunity 
of establishing how far we oan rely on British ~ 
fides."l The military elements of the German govern-
ment wanted the treaties to aot as a oamouflage of 
friendliness for their inoreased rivalry for naval 
supremaoy.2 It is believed that the revival of the 
negotiations prior to the world war was made with the 
hope of getting England to remain neutral if a world 
1. Bulow, ~. £!i., I, 320. 
2. Dugdale, E.T.S., ~. oit., IV, 217. 
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war were to occur. l According to Lichnowsky, 
England was anxious to turn German energies into 
channels less dangerous to England. The English 
had some hope of sublimating the energy expended in 
Germany on an increased navy into a less harmful 
(to England) policy of colonial expansion. 2 Colonel 
House was probably right then when he said that each 
power was afraid of the other but unwilling to make 
the concessions that would make for a straight-
forward understanding. 
13. The agreement of 1913-1914 was an outgrowth 
of 1898. 
14. The agreement of 1913-1914 was more danger-
ous to. the integrity of Portugal. 
15. Germany and England had different concepts 
of the treaties. England believed that the treaties 
would not become effective until the sovereignty of 
portugal was impaired. Germany believed this too, 
but she wanted to contribute to the impairment of the 
sovereignty so that the treaties could become active. 
16. The background of the Anglo-German-Portu-
guese colonial problem indicated that a departure from 
1. Dugdale, E.T.S., ~. cit., IV, xv. 
2. Lichnowsky, ~. !!i., p. 226. 
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splendid isolation was i~nent. However, Salisbury, 
one of the last champions of this theory of policy, 
whose archaic nature even he reluctantly realized, 
made perhaps the last brilliant play of this policy. 
While England stood alone he shrewdly played other 
powers against one another to extricate England from 
a difficult situation. He played the needs, ambitions, 
and fears of Germany, Transvaal, portugal and France 
against one another. "Salisbury without exaggeration 
was one of the greatest British foreign ministers of 
the century. After Bismarck's fall, his primacy in 
world politics was unchallenged."l 
Muddling through had won another brilliant 
victory. portugal did not pay the piper as the theory 
of the treaty would have one believe. The seoond-rate 
statesmanship of Wilhelminian GermB.I1y oaused the Reioh 
to pay the piper. 
1. Ward and Gooch, .Q.E.. cit., III, 262. 
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Convention s1gned on the 30th instant 
between Great Britain and Germany, respect-
ing tbe position of the two Powers in 
oonneotion with a possible loan to Portugal 
on the security o~ the custoM revenues of 
the Portuguese Province. of MOzambique an! 
Angola, and the Portuguese portion of the 
Island of Timor. l 
Enclosure in No. 90 
COJ1TentioJl 
In view of the possibility tha.t Portugal -7 
require financial assistanoe from some fbreign Power 
or powers., and in order to obviate the international 
oomplications whioh suoh a condition of things may 
produoe, and to preserve her integrity and independ-
enee, the Undersigned. duly authorised by their 
respective Sovereigns, have agreed as follows: 
I. Whenever eitberthe British or the German 
Govermnent is 0 f opinion that it is expedient to 
acoede to a request for an advanoe of money to Porta-
gal on the security of the CustODl8 revenues or other 
revenues of Mozambique, Angola, and the Portuguese 
part of the Island of Timor, it sliall commnnicate the 
fact to the other Govermnen1i, and the other Government 
shall have the right to advance a portion of the total 
BUll required. 
In the event of the other Government signify-
ing its intention to exeroise this right. the two 
Governments shall consult as to the terms of the two 
loans, and these loans shall be issued on the security 
of the Customs revenues of Mozambique, Angola, and 
Portuguese Timor as near as possible simnltaneously. 
The loans shall bear as near as possible the same 
proportion to eaoh other 8S the amounts of the Customa 
revenues respectively assigned as their security. 
The loans shall be issued on terms 8S favourable 
to Portugal as the oondition of the money market and 
1. Mr. B8ifour to sIr F. Lasoe1les, August 31, 
1898, ~.~., I, pp. 71-72, Enclosure No. to. 
...... -----------=---=-------~~~ ..... -.. -.--~-~. .. _ .. _._ .. ------
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the security of the loans permit, and shall ill other 
respects be subject as near as possible to similar 
conditions. 
II. Of the Customs revenues, referred to 1l'l 
Article I, those of the Province of MOsambique south 
of the Zambeli, and of the part of that province lying 
on the left bank of the Zambazi above ita confluence 
with tne Shire, and those of the portions of the 
Province of Angela, as hereinafter described, shall 
be aseigned to the British loan. The Customs revenues 
of the remaining parts of the ProvinceS of Mozambique 
and Angola and the Customs revenues of Portuguese Timor 
shall be assigned to the GerDBll loan. 
fhe portion of the Province of Angola, of 
which the Customs revenues shall be assigned to the 
British loan .. is comprised within the follwwing 11m1ts: 
the northern frontier shall run from the coast along 
the 8th parallel of south latitude to the 16th degree 
of longitude east of Greenwich, thence it shall 
descend that degree to the 9th· parallel of latitude, 
and shall follow that parallel eastwards as far as 
the frontier of the Congo hee State. fhe southern 
frontier shall start from a point on the ooast I 
Engliah miles north of Egito, and shall run thence 
due east t~ the eastern frontier of the Province of 
Angola. The western frontier shall be the sea; the 
eastern frontier shall be the eastern limit of the 
Province of Angola. 
III. Any Delegates sent by Great Britain or Germany 
to take note of the colle ction of the revenues which 
are the security for ~tr respective loans shall have 
on17 rights of inspection, but no rights of administra-
tion, interference, or control, 80 long as there is no 
default in the payment of interest or siIlking fund. 
IV. In case of default in the payment of the 
interest or sinking fund of either loan, the adminis-
tration of the various oustom-houses in the two 
provinces and in Portuguese Timor shall be handed 
over by Portugal; those assigned for the German loan 
to Germany, those assigned for the British loan to 
Great Britain. 
T. It is Will understood that allrtghts, whether 
British or German, acquired in the provinces affeoted 





safeguarded, provided they are of 8. purely private 
character, and convey neither political rights nor 
territorial or administrative Jurisdiction. 
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It is also understo cd that no influence wUl 
be used in the future, either by the British or the 
German Government., to obtain fresh Conoession., 
except in those portions of the proTinces of which 
the custome revenues are assigned to their respective 
loans. 
VI. The present Convention shall be ratified, and 
the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged as soon 
as possible. The Convention shall come into foroe 
immediately after the exchange of ratifications. 
In Witness whereof the Undersigned. dul7 
authorised, have signed the same. and have affixe' 
thereto their seals. 
Done in duplicat •• at London. the 30th day of 
August. 1898. 
(L • S. ) AR THOR JAMES BALFOUR 
(L.S.) P. RATZ~ELDT 
I 
I , ~ 
APPENDIX :B 
Secret Convention betwee~ Great Britain 
and Ge rm8lll'1 
Enclosure in No. 91 
Secret Convention 
Whereas, notwithstanding the provisions of the 
preceding Convention of this day's date, it may unfor-
tunately not be found possible to maintain the 
integrity of the African possessions of Portugal 
south of the Eluator, as well a8 of those in Timor, 
the Undersigned, duly authorised by their respective 
Sovereigns, have further agreed as follows: 
I. Great Britain and Germany agree jointly to 
oppose the intervention of ~ third Power in the 
Provinces of Mozambique, Angola, and in Portuguese 
Timor, either by way of loan to Portugal on the 
security of the revennes of those provinces, or by wa7 
of aoquisition of territory, by grant, oession, pur-
chase, lease, or otherwise. 
II. It is understood that, from the conclusion of 
the Conventions of this day's ~te, Great Britain will 
abstain from advancing any claim of whatsoever kind to 
the possession, occupation, control, or exercise of 
political influence in or over those portions of the 
Portuguese provinces in which the Customs revenues 
have been assigned to Germany, and that Germany will in 
like manner abstain from advancing any claim of what-
soever kind to the possession, occupation, control, or 
exercise of political influence, in or over those 
portions of those Portuguese provinces in which Customs 
revenues have been assigned to Great Britain. 
III. In case Portugal renounces her sovereign rights 
over MOzambique, Angola, and portuguese Timor, or 
loses these territories in any other manner, it i8 
understood that the subjects of, and natives of the 
Protectorates of, one Contraoting Party, together with 
their goods and ships, and also the produce and the 
manufactures of its dominions, posseSSions, Colonies 
1. Ii. Balfour to Sir F. Lasceiies, August 31, 
189S, B.D., It '1S, Enclosure No. 91. --
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and protectorates, shall, in such portions of the 
territories comprised in the present Convention as 
may fall to the other Contracting Party, participate 
ia all the prerogatives, exemptions and privileges 
with regard to trade, commerce, taxation and naviga-
tion which are there enjoyed by the subjects of, and 
natives of the Protectorates of, the other Contract-
ing Party. 
IV. With refard to the vth Article of the Conven-
tion of to-day s date, which refers to private rights 
of British or German subjects in the Provinoes of 
Mozambique, Angola, and the Portuguese Timor, it is 
well understood between the two Govenunents ~hat this 
Article applies, among others, to the so-calle' 
Katembe Conce8sion, and, fUrther, that the Government 
of Great Britain wUl adopt a friendly attitude in 
respect to the oonfirmation of this ConceSSion by the 
Portuguese Government in case such a confirmation 
should be applied for. 
v. !he present ConTention shall be ratified, and 
the ratifioations thereof shall be exohanged a8 soon 
as possible. The COJl9'ention shell come into force 
immediately after the exohange of ratifioations. 
In witness whereof the 17ndereigned, dul,. 
authorised, have Signed the same, and have affixed 
thereto their seals. 
Done in duplicate, at London, the 30th day of 
August, 1898. 
(L.8. ) ARTHUR JAMES :BALFOUR 







Seoret Rote, Signe d b7 Count Hatsfeldt 
and A. J. Balfourl 
Bncloaure in No. 92 
Secret Note 
In order to make clear the intention of the 
two Conventions of thi8 day's date, it is further 
understood between the two Governments as follows: 
In the event of one of the two Gevernments 
obtaining from the Portuguese Government before the 
oontingency oontemplated in Article III of the Secret 
Convention a cession of territory, or the conce8sion 
of special privileges not of an cccasional charaoter, 
in those portions of the Portuguese Provinoes of 
Mozambique, Angola, or Timor, the oustoms revenues of 
which have been assigned to it, it is well understood 
between the two Governments the.t such cessions of 
territory, or oonce8sions of privileges, shall not 
beoome operative until analogous grants as near 8S 
possible of equal value have been accorded to the 
other Government in those portions of the provinces. 
the oustoms revenues of which have been 8ssigned to 
it by the present arrangement.· 
In oase either Government applies for special 
privileges of an ocoasional oharaoter, it shall 
immediately inform the other Government, and if these 
privileges are granted, and if the other Government 
should desire it, Shall use its influenoe to obtain 
for the other Government similar speoial privilege. 
of an ocoasional oharacter and of equal value. 
And whereas, owing to the imperfect survey. 
whioh alone are at present available, the lInd 
A~icle of the Convention of this dayls date may not 
1. This note explains the posItion of Grea' 
Britain and Germany in certain eventUalities in regard 
to the Portuguese pcssessions in Africa, south of the 
Equator, and the Portuguese portion of the Island of 
Timor. Mr. Balfour to Sir F. LaBoelles, August 31, 
1698, B.D., I, '14-5, Enolosure No~ 92. --
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exactly carry out the intentions of the Contracting 
parties, it is understood between them that in aD7 
oase the port and town of Ambriz shall be inoluded in 
the seourity assigned to GermaD7. 
In oase, therefore. that the port and town of 
Ambriz should be found to lie to the south of the 8th 
parallel of south latitude. the line of demaroation 
shall start from a point on the coast 5 English miles 
south of the port of Ambriz, and be continued thenoe 
due east untU it reaches the 16th degree of longitude 
east of Greenwioh. 
From the interseotion of the line t Which mal 
be determined a8 the line of demaroation, with the 
16th degxoee of longitude aforesaid, the line shall. 
if necessar" be extended along that degree of longi-
tude 80 far south of the 9th parallel of south lati-
tude as will secure to Germany a strip of territorl 
not less than a geographical degree in width between 
the southern extrem1 ty of the Oongo Free State in the 
regiol1 of Lunda and the northern frontier of the 
portion of Angola of whioh the oustom. reVenues are 
&ssigned to Great Britain. 
Done in Duplioate. at London, the 30th day of 
August, 1898. 
(L.S.) ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR 
(L.S'.) P. RATZFELM 
I , 
APPENDIX D 
Anglo·Portuguese Secret Drclaration 
ootober 14, 1699 
Secret 
The Government of Her Majesty the Queen of 
the United Kingdom of Grea.t Britain and Ireland, 
Empress Of India, and the Government of His MOst 
Faithful Majesty the King of Portugal and the Algarves, 
considering 8S of full force and effect the anoient 
treatie s of alliance, amity and guarantee which sub-
sist between the two Crowns, specifically oonfirm on 
this occasion Article I of the Treaty of the 29th 
January, 1642, whi oh runs as follows: 
"It is oonoluded and acoorded that there 
is, and shall be for ever, a good true and 
firm peace and amity between the most renowned 
Kings, Charles King of Great Britain and John 
the Fourth King of Portugal, their heirs and 
suooessors, and their Kingdoms, Countries, 
Dominions, Lands, People, Liegemen, Vassals 
and SUbjeots whomaoever, present and to come, 
of whatsoever oondition, dignity or degree they 
may be, 8.S well by land 8.S by sea and fresh 
waters, so as the said Vassals and Subjects 
are each of them to favour the other and to 
use one another with friendly offices and true 
affection, and that neither of the said most 
renowned Kings, their heirs and suocessors, 
by himself or by any other, ahall do or attempt 
anything against eaoh other, or their Kingdoms, 
by land or by sea, nor shall oonsent nor adhere 
unto any war, counsel, or Treaty, in prejudioe 
of the other." 
They equally oonfirm the final Article of the 
Treaty of the 23rd June, 1661, of which the first 
part runs as follows: 
"Over and above all and Singular agreed and 
oonoluded in the ,Treaty of Marriage between the 
Mo st ,'serene and Mo at Powerful Charle s, the 




Seoond of that name, King of Great Britain . 
and the Most Virtuous and Serene Lady 
Catherine, Infanta of Portugal, it is by the 
Secret Article oonoluded and accorded, that 
His Majesty of Great Britain, in regard of 
the great advantages and increase of dominion 
he hath purchased by the above-mentioned 
Treaty of Marriage shall promise and oblige 
himself, as by this present Artio1e he doth, 
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to defend and protect all oonquests or ooloni •• 
belonging to the Crown of portugal against all 
his enemies, as well future a8 present.-
The Government of Hia Most Faithful Majest7 
undertakes not to permit, after the deolaratioXl of war 
between Great Britain and the South African Republic, 
or during continuance of the war, the importation ancl 
passage of arms, and of munitions of war destined for 
the latter. 
The Government ot His Most Faithful Majesty 
will not proclaim neutF$lity in the war between Great 
Britain and the South African Republio. 
Done in duplicate, at London, this 14th day of 
Ootober, 1899. 
(L.S.) SALISBURY 
(L.a.) LUIZ DE SOVERAL 
APPENDIX K 
Enclosure in No. 341 
Draft Conventio.l 
on Portugue Be Colonie. 
Initialled by Grey and Hatzfeldt 
October 20, 1913 
(Confidential) 
In view of the possibili ty that Portugal ID8J 
require financial assistance from some foreign Power 
or Powers .. &lid bl order to obTiate the international 
complioations whioh such a conditio. of things may 
produce, and to preserve her integrity and independ-
ence, and in view of the special interests of Great 
Britain and Germany in their respective possessiOns 
and protectorates in East and west Africa oontiguous 
to oertain Portuguese dominions, the underSigned, duly 
authorised by their respective Sovereigns, have agreed 
as follows: 
1. (ll Whenever either the British Or the German 
Government is of opinion that it is expedient to aooede 
to a request for an advance of money to Portugal on the 
security of the customs revenues or other revenue. of 
Mozambique or Angola, it shall commnnioate the fact to 
the other Government, and the other Government she.ll 
have the right to advance a part of the total sum 
reqUired. 
(2) In the event of the other Government 1J1gni-
fying its intention to exercise this right, the two 
Government 6 shall consult as to the terms of these two 
lO8ns,2 and these loans shall be issued on the security 
of the customs revenues of M.ozambique and Angola as 
near! as possible the same proportion to each other as 
th. e.mounts of the customs revenues respectively 
as signe d al the ir se curi ty. 
1. sir Edward Grey to PrInce LiclinowskY. jUly 31, 
1913, B.D., X, Pt. lIt No. 341. 
2. The final text initialled on October 20, 1913, 
has here "the two loans." . 
3. The final text initialled on October 20, 1913, 
has he re "nearly." 
1M 
(3) The loans shall be issued on terms as 
favourable to Portugal as the condition of the money 
market and the seouri ty of the loans permit, and shall 
in other respeots be sub jeot as near1 as- poSSible to 
similar oonditions. 
2. In the oontingenoy oontemp1ated in the preced-
ing article the custom revenues of that portion of 
the provinoe of MOzambique lying south of a line start-
ing from the JOOuth of the River Lultugu., running thence 
along that river to its confluence wi th the River 
Lugera, thence along that river to its source, thence 
along the meridian of that source to the 16th parallel 
of south latitude, and thenee along that parallel to 
the boundary of the British protectorate of Nyassaland. 
as also the oustoms revenues of the portions of the 
provinoe of Angola lying to the east of the 20th 
meridian of east longitude and south of the Kassai 
River, shall be assigned to the British loan; whilst 
the oustoms revenues of the remaining parts of the 
provinces of Mozambique and Angola (which latter in-
cludes the administrative district of the Congo, which 
has its seat of government at Cabinda) shall be assigned 
to the German loan. 
3. In the event of ~reat Britain or Germany sending 
delegates to take note of the collection of the 
revenues, wh~ch are the security for their respective 
loans, the Portuguese Government shall be asked to 
give such delegates rights of inspection only, but no 
rights of administration, interference, or control, so 
long as there is no default in the payment of interest 
or sinking fund. 
4. In case of default in the payment of the interest 
or Sinking fund of either loan, it Shall be agreed with 
the Portuguese Government that they will hand over the 
administration of the various custom-houses in the two 
prQvinces: those assigned for the GerlD8I1 loan to Germany; 
those assigned for the British loan to Great Britain. 
I. (1) In the contingenoy contemplated in the 
preceding article all rights, whether British or German, 
acquired in the provinces affected, before the date of 
1. Ibid. 
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this convention, shall be fully safeguarded. provided 
they are of a purely private character and do not con-
vey either political rights, territorial jurisdiction, 
or administrative powers. 
(2) It is well understood that no influence 
will be used in the future either by the British or 
the German Government to obtain fresh oonoessiona, 
except in those portions of the provinces of Which the 
customs revenues would be assigned to the ir respective 
loans under the present convention. 
6. From the date of the conclusion of the present 
oonvention Great Britain will abstain from advancing 
any olaim of whatsoever kind to the possession, occupa-
tion, or oontrol of those portions of the Portuguese 
provinces in which the oustoms revenues would under the 
present convention be assigned to Germany, or of the 
islands of San Thome and Prinoipe, or to the exeroi •• 
of po1itioal influenoe in those territories or islands; 
and Germany will in like manner abstain from advancing 
any olaim of whatsoever kind to the possession, oooupa-
tion, or control of those portions of the Portuguese 
provinces in Which the oustoms revenue s would under 
the present oonvention be asstgned to Great Britain, 
or of the portuguese part of the island of Timor, or 
to the exeroise of political influenoe in those terri-
tories or in that island. 
,. (l) In the event of either Government obtaining 
from the Portuguese Government a cession of terri tory, 
or the concession of special privileges not of an 
oocasionall oharacter. in those portion. of the 
provinces of Mozambique or Angola of which the customs 
revenues would be assigned to it, suoh oessions of 
territory or oonoessions Qf privileges shall nOi 
beoome operative until analogous grants as near as 
possible of equal value have been aooorded to the other 
Government in those portions of the provinces of whioh 
the customs revenues would be assigned to it by the 
present convention. 
(2) In oase either Government applies for epeoial 
privileges of an oooasionall charaoter in those portions 
1. The final text inItialled on Ootober 20, 191!, 
adds here "that ie, minor or temporary." 
2. The final text initialled on Ootober 20, 1913. 
has here "nearly." 
.", 
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of the Portuguese provinces of which the customs 
revenues would be assigned to it under the present 
convention, it shall immediately inform the other 
Goverlmlent and, if these pri Tileges are granted, and 
if the other Government Should 80 desire, shall uee 
ita influence to obtain for the other Government 
similar special privileges of an occasional character 
and of equal value. 
S. If in any part of the provinces of Mozambique 
or Angola the lives or property of BritiSh or German 
subjects, or the vital !nterests of the ad30ining 
British or German dominions or proteotorates, are en-
dangered by looal disturbances or by the action of 
the local authorities, and the Portuguese Government 
are not 1a a position to afford the necessary protect-
iOB, or otherwise fail to do so, the British and 
German Governments, after consulting together, and 
after a joint communication to the Portuguese Govern-
ment, ahall determine the nature, duration, and scope 
of such measures as it may be deemed necessary to take 
for the protection of the interests endangered. 
9. If any of the Portuguese colonie. in question, 
having beoome independent and having been reoognise' 
as such by the two high oontracting parties, or if any 
part of such independent colony, should declare its 
annexation to the dominions of one of the two contract-
ing Powers, the other contracting Power Shall, for its 
part, be entitled, after previously informing the first 
Power, to annex those portions of such colony, thna 
become independent, of which the oustoms revenues would 
be assigned to it under the present couventioB. 
10. Great Br itainand Germany, having regard to the 
interests of their respective posseBsions in East and 
West Africa contiguouB to the Portuguese provinces of 
Angola and Mozambique, which would be materially 
affected by the intervention of any third Power in 
those provinces, agree jointly to oppose suoh inter-
vention whether by way of loan to Portugal on the 
security of the revenues of the said provinces, or by 
way of acquisition of territory by grant, ceSSion, 
purohase, lease or otherwise. 
11. In 10 far as Great Britain or Germany may here-
after influence or control the administration ot 
MOzambique or Angola or any portion of those province8, 
it is understood that the subjeots. $lld·native. of the 
." 
1" 
protectorates. of one contracting party. together 
wit h the ir goode and ships, and also the produoe and 
the manufacture s of its dominions, possessions, 
colonies. and protectorates, shall, in such portions 
of the territories comprise in the present convention 
as may fall under the influence or control of the 
other contracting party, partioipate in all the pre-
rogatives, exemptions, and privileges with regard to 
trade, commerce. taxation, and navigation whioh are 
there enjoyed by the subjeots, and natives of the 
protectorates, of the other contracting party. 
12. The effect of the provisions of the present 
convention is shown generally on the annexed copy of 
Stanford's Map of Afrioa, 1911. 
13. The present oonlention shall replaoe a8 between 
the oontraoting Powers the oonvention, secret conven-
tion, and seoret note concluded and signed in London 
on the 30th August. 1898, which are hereby abrogated. 
14. The present oonvention shall be ratified and 
the ratifioations thereof shall be exohanged as soon 
as possible. The convention shall oome into force 
immediatelY after the exohange of ratifioations. 
In witness whereof the undersigned, d'Dly 
authorised, have Signed the same, and have affixed 
thereto their se als. 
Done in duplicate at London, the 
• 19112 
day 0:[ 
1. The final text initialled on October 20, 1913, 
omits the words "as between the contra~ting Powers." 
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